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CHAPTER I

The Vital Points of Fuseki

During the early stages of fuseki which exert a great influence on the future development of a game of go it is probably more important to grasp the essential factors by intuition than to make a deep analysis of local situation.

This is the wide field of vision which requires deep insight to determine the points of profit and influence, and one should master this power to discern the relative importance of plays and the far-seeing wisdom to derive profit from emergencies.



Since the common rules of fuseki concerning occupation of the corners, their closing and attack are given in the specialized books on that subject, I will give only two or three basic tactical rules at this point as a foundation for an intuitional grasp of the subject and then proceed to a more detailed discussion.

The essentials of the Splitting Play


The situation in diagram 1 appeared in the first game of the sixth Honinbo title match, which was fought on April 4, 11881. Let us study the splitting play which White made on the lower side with his eighth play.

First, if white had used this eighth play according to joseki as shown in diagram 1-A, leading to the Black formation in 1-B, then, in contrast to White's over-concentration on the left side, Black's occupation of the handicap points Q-16 and Q-4 imposes a good balance over the board as a whole and it cannot be denied that White is slow at first and has allowed his opponent to get a start over him. It can never be forgotten that over-concentration of strength is forbidden in fuseki.

Diagram 1



And yet, if White abandons the lower side entirely, and if one assumes the sequence of diagram 1-B ending with Black 5 at K-3, this division of territory is also unprofitable for White.




Again, considering the lower-side, if White plays at J-3 as shown in diagram 1-C, since the White stone there adjoins a strong Black position it cannot fail to be unprofitable, and when it suffers the excellent squeezing attack (or attack from both sides) which comes with Black 6 at L-3, White's posture is very cramped.

Thus, it will be seen that White's eighth play was very brilliant and required an intense study of the entire board. Moreover, this splitting play was made because of the fact that there is room for a two-space extension either to the left or the right.

Concerning the Width of Extensions

Extensions are made from two to as far as five spaces. I believe that in actual play errors of judgement in selecting the correct extension are frequent. Of course, it goes without saying that the surrounding formations, the course that the battle may take in the future, and so on, determine the final decision, but let us examine the following situation from an actual game.

Diagram 2



Where the formation is as shown in diagram 2, the choice of an extension of three, four, five spaces at A, B, or C, or rarely the two-space extension at D, is determined entirely by the situation on the lower right side of the board. I hope that the reader will analyze the following diagrams before looking at the answers on the next page.

Diagram 2-A




Diagram 2-B




Diagram 2-C




Diagram 2-D






Diagram 2-A'



In this case it is correct to limit the extension to two spaces. If through greed Black extends to A or farther it will be ineffective against the impregnable White position in the lower-right-corner, and even worse, since there remains the possibility of a White invasion at B it should be considered a heavy burden.

Diagram 2-B'



Black 1 at J-3 is an ideal fuseki in this case, since it combines an extension with a squeeze-play. If Black restrains himself to extension at A, he gives White room for extension at B and this cannot be considered satisfactory for Black.

Diagram 2-C'






Diagram 3



The turning movement called "stopping on two and extending three" is partially explained with reference to limitation on extension in the ancient Chinese book "HSUAN HSUAN CHI CHING." Let us examine its significance in the following concrete examples.

In diagram 3, if White extends to A from the stone at O-3, the possibility of an invasion at M-3 is left. If the extension is made with White 1 at L-3 as shown here, there is no worry about the connection being broken; therefore one can say that the limit of extension from an isolated stone on the third line is two spaces.

Diagram 4




The joseki of the high attack at a one-space interval.

In this sequence of plays, White, after "stopping on two" with White 5, can make a three-space extension with White 7. That is, even if Black should invade with Black 8 at A, since White can block him off with White 9 at B


and obtain a perfect connection this is another example of "stopping on two and extending three". Note that if White extends farther with White 7 at C, Black can invade at B.

Diagram 5



When a player stops on three as shown in this diagram he is quite safe in extending four spaces, as White does here with White 1 J-3. Against Black 2 L-3 White follows the sequence shown here and after White 7 L-5 he has nothing whatever to fear.

Diagram 6



Here also it is possible for White to extend four spaces to A as in the previous example, but since Black can play at B, making an extra reinforcing play necessary for White in order to defend himself against the invasion at C, he limits himself to the three-space extension with White 7, although this is not an invariable rule.

The
Vital Points
Of
GO

By
SHUKAKU TAKAGAWA
Honorary Honinbo

A WORD from the AUTHOR

Strictly speaking, all of the plays in go must be made at essential points. However, it is evident that among these there must be those that would be called "vital points." Just as in singing, no matter how earnestly the singer may follow the notes, he will not create a beautiful song if he misses the tempo, so in go, no matter how faithful the player may be to joseki or fuseki an outstanding game cannot be expected to develop from plays which miss these vital points.

This book has been compiled from material serialized in the Asano newspaper and in Kido which attracted unexpectedly favorable attention and comment. I have selected appropriate parts of the principal subject and systematically recompiled and expanded them, making special effort to bring out the vital points. Nothing could give me greater pleasure than to know that I have succeeded in enabling the reader to grasp the inner working involved in these problems.

CONTENTS


The Vital Points of Go

A Brief Biography of the Author

A Word from the Author

Chapter	Page
I The Vital Points of Fuseki.	1
II The Essentials of Attack and Defense	44
III How to Diminish Large Enemy Territories . .	125
IV The Analysis of the Relative Values of Plays .	189
V The Development of Intuition.	227


Diagram 11



The relation between strength and extension

When a White and a Black stone confront one another in the corner as shown here and Black extends five spaces with Black 1 J-3, then the exchange White 2 Q-5 (or alternatively at A), Black 3 N-4 (or at B), is just common sense in *fuseki*. (See the next diagram)

Diagram 12




If White omits his play at Q-5, Black can make a fierce attack beginning with Black 1 at that point. White 2 and 4 are a standard form, but as the pressure continues

with Black 5 and onward the Black extension at J-3 forms a background for this strength and develops its maximum effectiveness.

If Black had extended only to A or less, then in contrast to the strength of his wall, the narrowness of his extension would have been unsatisfactory and he would not have displayed much efficiency in his plays.

Therefore when the formation is that of diagram 12, White 2 Q-5 should be made as a precaution inspired by a calm sensitivity for the *fuseki*.


Diagram 13



The necessity for a White stone at Q-5 steadily diminishes as the Black extension grows narrower, but in the case of the five-space extension it is a necessary play which Black answers by an enclosing play at A, as discussed above. Let us study the results which follow if Black neglects to play at A.

If Black omits the play at A, White 1 L-3 opens a highly damaging invasion. Although Black gets some elbow-room on one side by the sequence from Black 2 to Black 6 before playing Black 8, White can finally burst out with a cut on White 9, and it is seen that Black's attempt to surround him does not succeed.

Diagram 14



If the Black extension is only four spaces wide as in this case, and the sequence of plays is the same as that of the preceding diagram, then Black 8 can bottle up White completely, thus showing that even a difference of one space in the extension is not anything that can be trifled with.

Diagram 15




Diagram 15 A Further Explanation of the previous Diagram

When Black 4 is played, White can come out with

White 5. However, this leaves the painful cut at Black 6, and even if White covets the plays 7 and 9, he is at a loss for an answer, after the excellent play Black 10.

If, after Black 10, White plays at A, then Black can play at B, while if White comes down to B, Black can play at A, and the affair goes poorly for White.

Diagram 16





Diagram 16 The Case of a Three-Space Extension.

White invades with White 1, and after defending against the cut at A with White 5, he can come out with 7, but when it is observed that after Black comes down with 6 he threatens to play at B, this sequence is seen to be completely unacceptable.

NOTE: It is also possible for Black to play at B immediately in answer to White 1.

Diagram 17



The Concept of Corelation

Diagram 17 An example with one stone on either side of the corner handicap point. (*ikken shimari*)

The Black extension with Black 2 in answer to White 1 on Black B in answer to White A is an important demonstration of how to react in a corelation.

Diagram 18




Diagram 18 The results of making light of corelation and being attacked by White at 1.

If Black reacts to the White attack at 1 by playing at A he is safe, but his opponent has already profited by his failure to respond to the attack [from the other side

of the formation], and if he again plays elsewhere instead of answering, then White 1 D-3 deals him a fatal blow; and since there is no reason for him to submit to the destruction of his formation shown here, unless there is something equally urgent elsewhere he must not lose the proper order of play in the confrontation.

Diagram 19





Diagram 20



These show variations of the basic situation. The sequence of diagram 19 is obviously superior to the failure shown in diagram 20, but in both cases White is able to seize the initiative.

Balance Between High and Low Plays

Diagram 21




Diagram 21 Let us study an example from a recent popular *fuseki*. When the *shimari* in the lower-right-corner is made on the third line with a stone at O-3, then against the attack of Black 1 the squeeze play of White 2 on the fourth line is appropriate.

If White plays at A on the third line, then from the standpoint of harmony or symmetry of the game as a whole his position on this side of the board is too low.

Diagram 22




Diagram 22 With the high *shimari* shown here, the low squeeze-play of White 2 is permissible. This is but one example, but having one side low when the other is high is common sense in *fuseki*. As the ninth rank player Go Sei-gen has so wisely observed, "Go is the art of harmony." (The word used here can also be translated as "symmetry" or "proportion"), and the significance of this remark can be observed in these cases.

Diagram 23




Diagram 23 Making The Most of a *Joseki* Position

When the position is as given in this diagram, selection of the high-attack *joseki* shown here from Black 1 to Black 7 results in failure. White is allowed the two-space extension at A, and Black 7 is unsatisfactory since it does not attack him. Nevertheless, Black 7 cannot be pushed forward to B, since this would expose him to White's invasion at C.

Diagram 24




Diagram 24 In such cases it is appropriate to choose the type of sequence shown here from Black 1 to Black 5, which combines extension and a squeeze-play and avoids the ruin of the *joseki* by becoming the prisoner of its

strict form.

Note (1) Even if White 2 were played at A it would still be correct for Black 5 to be played as shown here.

Note (2) It might be thought that in order to spoil Black's tactics when he plays at Black 1 White might anticipate him by playing first at L-3, but then, by selecting the joseki at B, Black could place himself in a splendid fighting position.

DETAILED DISCUSSION

Diagram 25




Diagram 25 A study of the methods of enclosing territory.

The correct sequences: White 1, Black 2, or White A, Black B were discussed in the section on basic theory, but now let us look further into the reasons for them.

Diagram 26





Diagram 26 If the play White 1 is answered with Black 2, then White can immediately jump to White 3 and in order to answer this Black 4 cannot be omitted: thus this sequence results in the folly of using two plays where one should have been sufficient. This is the chief difference between the sequences of Diagrams 25 and 26, and shows that even in surrounding the same territory there must be vital points.

Reference Diagram



Notes: (Reference Diagram) When White plays at D-6 it is not absolutely necessary that Black should play at A, since even if the play White 1 is permitted, Black can still manage by playing the sequence from Black 2 to Black 6 as shown here.

Diagram 27




Diagram 27 A Taboo in Fuseki

When White 2 is played in answer to Black 1, in case of necessity the Black stone has in reserve the sequence of pressure plays beginning with Black 3. This diagram shows one of the forms of receiving this pressure up to Black 21. Keeping these facts in mind let us go on to the next diagram.

Diagram 28




Diagram 28 Here it is wrong for White to play White 2 in answer to Black 1. If White dares to do so then Black without hesitation will launch the series of attacks beginning with Black 3 on the right and Black 7 on the left, forcing White to crawl along in a low posture along the bottom side.

Moreover there remains the submissive sequence shown in the following diagram from Black 1 to White 10.

Diagram 28 A




Diagram 29




Diagram 29 A Warning About Black 1, K-3.

The sequence of plays from White 2 through Black 5 are necessary preliminaries, but if one thinks of them in a different order, does it not seem that the selection of the extension from Black 1 to Black 5 was not urgent?

Moreover, White's profit in the sequence from White 6 onward steadily reveals the redundancy and lack of urgency of Black 1.

The extension of Black 1 presupposes preparation by a Black stone at P-4 or O-4.

Diagram 30




Diagram 30 An Example of an Exception permitting Black 1.

If Black 1 were played at E-4, this would not only give White an opportunity to seize the best point by playing at K-3, but, of itself it would not seriously influence White. On the other hand, it is permissible to play Black 1 as shown here, even though Black is under White's pressure in the sequence of plays from White 2 onward, and the value of Black 1 in this position increases in inverse proportion to the width of White's extension on the left.

Diagram 31




Diagram 31 The Problems of Taking up a Position and of Large Areas.

The dominating position in this large area is at A, and Black is eager to seize it in his turn to play, but if he plays at A, it will immediately provoke a White attack at B and Black will be pushed down into the low territory along the edge. On the other hand, if Black plays first B, White in his turn will seize the position at A immediately; therefore Black must find some device to escape these alternatives.

Diagram 32




Diagram 32 In such cases Black 1 is opportune.

If White then insists on playing White 2 at E-5, Black will simply play Black 3 F-4, and when White 4 bottles up the Black stone at C-7, Black takes a little profit with Black 5 C-4, followed by Black 7 F-5; and if Black reaches his objective with Black 9 L-3 it is clear that these tactics have been effective, and that the sacrifice-stone, Black 1 has not died in vain.

Note: If White used his fourth play at L-3, the following sequence is possible:

White 4 L-3	Black 5 at A
White 6 F-5	Black 7 at B

However, it cannot be ignored that the Black spear-point at B casts a very bad influence on the White stone at L-3.

Diagram 33




Diagram 33 If White 1 were used for the squeeze-play at J-3, Black would attack at A, but if White 1 were played at A, this would permit Black to extend to J-3 or to some other point. Therefore White plays White 1 against the Black stone, extends with White 3, and when Black defends himself with Black 6, White returns to the squeeze-play White 7, which is what he has been waiting for.

For what would happen if Black used his sixth play to reinforce himself in the area around J-3, see the following diagram.

Diagram 34




Diagram 34 In this case White 7 is a thrust at the vital point and Black cannot avoid the sequence which forces him into the stupid formation shown here.

Diagram 35




Diagram 35 What Happens When White 4 is Played Elsewhere

Black 1 and 3 are counter-measures to the White tactics of playing at Q-5 against the Black stone at R-5, then extending one line upward to P-5. If White 4 is played elsewhere, Black opens hostilities by cutting with Black 5: if White were connected at this point he could extend toward A. Thus the tactics of both players here are of the deepest interest.

Diagram 36




Diagram 36 Examination of Gaps on the Edge.


The problem is to decide whether Black 1 is of greater value in defending the lower right or the lower left corner.

On the right side Black 1, in correlation with the stone at O-3 secures for Black territory of more than ten points. On the left side the gap leaves room for White to penetrate to A, Black withdraws to B, and the actual value of Black 1 is slight. Thus we see that in the left-hand corner Black 1 is of little value.

No attempt should be made to enclose a corner where there is a gap on each side.

Diagram 37

Diagram 38



Diagrams 37 and 38 Try to judge the value of Black 1 in each of these cases.

Diagram 38-A





Diagram 38-A In diagram 37 Black 1 takes all the territory in the lower left side of the board, but here even after the closing with Black 1, there is room for White to make mischief with White 2, therefore not all of this territory can be regarded as belonging to Black.

Therefore the value of Black 1 is greater in diagram 37, and one should always keep in mind the importance of this way of thinking in judging the value of plays.

Diagram 39 and Diagram 40



Diagrams 39 and 40 From the examples given above it will be quite clear which of the two situations shown there yield the greater profit when Black 1 is played. In diagram 39 Black 1 almost completely assures the territory on the left, while in diagram 40 it is sufficient to note the reduction brought about by White 2 and 4.

Diagram 41




Diagram 41 As discussed above, a Black stone at O-4 does not imply a closure of the corner. Therefore it is the worst possible idea to play at A against White 1 and then to close at B. It is also ineffective simply to jump to O-6.

You should grasp the more aggressive idea of a counterattack with the Black 2 as shown in this diagram, followed by Black 4 when White runs away with White 3.

It is true that Black could attack very strongly by placing Black 2 at C, but then after White 3 M-5 Black 4 to 6, White could also bring pressure to bear on Black by playing at D, therefore we dislike a Black play at C because it advances too near to White.

Diagram 42





Diagram 42 When Black is very solid as he is here on the left, Black 1 is a very strong play, and after White 2 H-5 the Black pursuit with Black 3, K-5 is a good play.

Diagram 43




The value of the three-three point

Diagram 43 Let us investigate the value of the three-three point from an opposite standpoint to that of guarding the corner when there are gaps on the edge.

In the case shown here, a white play at A has no great importance. Even if Black were to close off the corner by playing at B before this play could be made, there is still room for White to invade at C or D, and since White can also slip in underneath at B it is not possible to consider all of the territory on the right as belonging to Black.

Diagram 44



However, if Black K-3 is added, then the value of White 2 R-3 suddenly becomes large. If one assumes the future form shown here from White 2 on to White 8, and compares the consequences of this to what would have happened had Black forestalled this sequence by playing first at R-4.

Leaving aside a Black invasion at A as a separate problem, one sees that there is actually a difference of more than 20 points, and if the variation of diagram 44-A is considered the the superfluity of Black 1 cannot be denied.

Diagram 44-A






Diagram 45




In answer to White 1, his opponent's first blow in an attempt to reduce his potential territory Black defends himself as shown here in the sequence from Black 2 onward: where then as White observes Black's growing hold over this territory should he use his ninth play? Black has neglected the point A and this, even if it were closed, leaves him exposed in too large an area.

Diagram 46




Needless to say, White comes in at the three-three point, and from there up to White 13 the sequence follows a common pattern, but White 13 raises the possibility for White to come down at A, then take the important point at B, as a result of which White takes enough of the territory which Black has made.

Diagram 47



The first game of the Sixth Annual *Honinbo* Match. After White 1 and 3 there are various points at which White would like to play, but at this time the most urgent problem is that of the lower right corner where White cannot allow Black to play at A, seizing firm control over about 40 points of territory. Therefore after the Black 4

Diagram 47 A




the sequence continued as shown in diagram 47-A:

White 4 at R-3, Black 6 at R-4, White 7 at Q-3, Black 8 at P-4, White 9 at L-15, (Diagram 47-B).


When White turned away from the corner to L-15 he was thinking of the exchange from White 5 R-3 to Black 9 P-4 as a profit safely in hand while with the situation left as it was at that point Black still needed one more play there.

Diagram 47 B



If the play had continued as shown here the reduction in Black's territory would have been twenty some points, and the White territory in the corner seven points. Compared with the case when Black closes this corner by his play at A in diagram 47, the actual difference exceeds 30 points.


Diagram 48



The width of a squeeze play.

When the emphasis is placed on the side rather than on the corner, it is customary to launch the attack from both flanks with Black 2. Let us now investigate the usual reaction the problem presented when White in answer to this attack comes into the three-three point in the corner with White 3, and Black must judge whether it is better to pin this White 3 down by playing at Q-3 or at R-4.


Diagram 48-A



If Black 4 is played as shown here the sequence from White 5 to Black 12 is *joseki*. The result is that the squeeze play Black 2 turns out to have been made at a good


distance. It will be understood that if the play were made closer in that Black 2 R-3, it would result in an even greater degree of over-concentration of strength in direct proportion to the nearness of its approach to the Black corner group.

Diagram 49



Therefore, when the squeeze play is made close in, as with Black 2 M-3 shown here, the White stone at the three-three point should be contained with Black 4 R-4, then after White 7 S-3 (or alternately White A) Black 8 N-5 can close the White group in completely. That is, a close-in squeeze play with Black 2 should be made when it is one's intention to colonize the right side of the board in cooperation with a previously played Black stone at or near B.

Diagram 50




The idea of defending against White 1 G-3 with Black 2 N-3 must be considered very shallow, since White can still invade at A. If this happens and Black defends at B the over-concentration of strength on his part is extreme.

The clue to this *fuseki* is as follows: If the corner comes first for Black, he should close it by playing at B; If he thinks of placing the greatest emphasis on the side, he can build on a large scale by playing at C.


The following diagram shows what may happen if Black jumps to C and White comes into the corner at A.

Diagram 51



The sequence of plays from White 2 to Black 17 is one possible variation. White's plays in answer to Black 1 are sound.


Diagram 52



On the sensitive judgement of a situation.

White's plan in this case was first to moderate the attack of Black 1 by playing White 2, then to counterattack with White 4 and 6, which simultaneously open up wide prospects for him on the lower left side of the board. This plan was appropriate here, it was followed consistently through and there is no fault to be found with it.


Diagram 53



However, in this diagram there is the strong two-space Black extension on the left side. If White were to play at A, and Black at R-7, the result would not only be to give the profit to his enemy, but he would have no way to find any compensation for it.

Accordingly the White stone at P-3, which has very little future, should be abandoned. The vital point in this situation for White lies in shifting his weight to the right side and without hesitation conquering a vast new world there with White 1 and 3. The result of this is that Black is left with an unnecessarily congested shape on the lower side of the board, and moreover White still has room there for a play at B.

Diagram 54



This is the attack directly against the lower of the two stones closing off the corner.


If white were to approach the Black corner formation by playing at A, Black could answer at B; and still if White were to attack with White 1 at G-3 Black could play at C; when neither of these alternatives is attractive, White 1 C-5 directly against the corner stone may be used.

Here White works on the left side up to his ninth play, then tries to profit rather quickly on the right with White 11,, but of course it goes without saying that a proper selection of timing and circumstances is necessary here.

Note 1: Black 12 defends against White at D.

Note 2: If White 13 is omitted Black at E could do great damage.

Diagram 55



When there is a Black stone on the side, such as the one shown here at K-3 for instance, the manoeuvres of the previous diagram are prohibited. It is unprofitable for White to provoke the building of this huge Black area thinking that he is solidifying his own territory on the left side. Therefore, in this case it is wise for White to make his first play cautiously at C-7 as shown in reference diagram, which leaves him the possibility of invading at A or elsewhere at some future time.

Reference Diagram





Diagram 56



What is the result in this *fuseki* of using these tactics of the double attack on both the right and left sides, beginning with White 1?

White's management on the upper side of the board with White 11 and 13 is successful, but since the order of play allows Black to seize the strategic position on the right side with Black 14 and 16, one must conclude that these tactics are dubious when White is not backed up by a previously placed stone at or near R-10.

Note 1: If White 11 were played at A, it might be endangered by a Black stone at B.


Note 2: The Black 12 shown here is more effective than it would be at C.

Note 3: If White 13 were played at D Black could separate it from the corner stone by playing at E, where

upon the spearpoint of Black 10 at N-14 would become menacing. That is to say, the extension with White 13 has only a slight relation to the isolated stone at White 11.

Note 4: When Black played 16 R-9 he had in mind both the push downward from Black 14 Q-12 to F, and the extension to G.

Diagram 57



In this diagram, note how Black develops following the attack by White 1, and that in contrast to White's duplication of effort he builds up a powerfully active position on the left side.

CHAPTER II


Essentials of Attack and Defense

PREFACE

In close hand-to-hand fighting the difference of a single play may be the deciding factor in victory or defeat.

The ability to make a deep and systematic analysis of a situation is necessary in order not to err in securing the initiative and in discovering the keys to new developments in difficult situations, and it is in the combination of just such powers that what is called *go* strength is to be found.

Diagram 1



Play from the *tsukenobi joseki*: It seems that there are many people who consider the sequence from White 1 to Black 8 to be just the typical *tsukenobi joseki* and who have not the slightest suspicion of it, but the new feeling concerning this is that the reinforcing play Black 8 O-4 shows signs of some duplication of effort.

Assuming a different order of play, if Black had answered with Black 2 at O-4, would he then have chosen to follow this with the *tsukenobi* play against White 1? Surely he would have made a squeeze-play against this isolated White stone from the direction of R-10.


(Note: *Tsukenobi* means, literally, to attach and extend. In *go* it refers to the manoeuvre of this diagram, where Black 2 is played directly against the opponent's stone, White 1, and Black 4 extends from Black 2.)

The result of clinging to Black as shown in this diagram, plus the plays White 9 and White 11 which follow it, is that White has been enabled to play as he pleases both on the right and on the left, and Black has been badly taken in the exchange.

Where then is the vital point of attack and defence to replace Black 8?

Needless to say, the correct play for Black is at the strategic point on the lower side, which he should occupy without hesitation.


Diagram 2



When this play has been made there are two sources of uneasiness for Black; a White thrust outward at Q-5 (this is treated in the following diagram), and the invasion with White 2 O-3.


Against White 2 O-3, Black strengthens his base with Black 3 P-3, forcing his opponent to make a play towards the center with White 4 O-4. Then, when he connects with Black 5 Q-5, it is as though Black 1 were placed to attack the two White stones and it is unquestionably in a dominant position.

Diagram 3



Concerning the White thrust out through the Black formation, and without considering his situation on the right, the sequence from White 1 through Black 10 as shown here may be allowed, and if you understand how the sequence beginning with Black 4 in answer to the cut with White 3 and continuing through Black 22 reproves the futility of White's stubborn play, you will have nothing to fear.

Diagram 4



Countering the Double Attack on the Corner Handicap Stone


Leaving aside a Black play at A as another problem, when a double attack is made as shown in this diagram, if the reply chosen is to be a play directly against one of the opponent's stones the rule is to play against his stronger stone.

In the case shown here the White stone on the right side of the board is the stronger, since the one on the left may be attacked from both flanks because it is between the Black stone at C-10 and the handicap stone. Therefore the policy of a deferred approach to the single White stone on the left, using the strength of Black 1 and 3 is correct.

After Black 5, if White thrusts outward at A it is profitable for Black to permit the following sequence:


White A, Black B;
White C, Black D;
White E, Black F.

Diagram 5



Plays made directly against the adversary's stones necessarily strengthen them also. Since it is not a bad idea to make your opponent add strength to stones which are already strong, the sequence shown in this diagram is appropriate for Black.


Diagram 6



In a local contest the most important problem is the efficiency of each play or how much work a stone does.

In this diagram, White 10 spies out the Black "bamboo joint" connection directly above it. Since this connection cannot be cut with less than two consecutive plays, White 10 is unreasonable and must be condemned for its low efficiency.


Diagram 7



In this diagram the *kosumi*, White 1, is correct play. When it is noted that it forces the sequence of plays up to Black 6, and that there remains the chance that in the future White, by playing at A, may be able to force Black to fill in one of his own points, one sees that there is no comparison between this and the White 10 at the preceding diagram.


The enquiring attitude which searches for the truth on the board in this manner is an important tool in grasping the key point of a situation.

Diagram 8




Here also the *kosumi* of White 1 is correct, and as in the preceding diagram, a thrust outward at A is unprofitable; therefore to probe into the connection by playing White 1 at C-5 would be contrary to the logic of *go*.

Diagram 9




The reinforcing play Black 8 following White 7 is often encountered, but it betrays Black's undigested knowledge of *joseki*, and his opponent is able to extend outward with White 9 which has a dominating influence over the entire game. Rather than using Black 8 merely to defend at this point, it would have been far better for him simply to have jumped to D-6 with Black 2 and then to have attacked the solitary White stone from the direction of A.

Diagram 10




Here the *hane* of Black 8 at the head of the two White stones, (3 and 7), and his reinforcing play Black 10 are plays made under tension. It should be carefully remembered that Black 8 occupies a vital point which determines the rise or fall of the power of both players.

Diagram 11



Concerning the Escape of the White Stones at G-4 and G-6
It would be too planless in this situation for Black if he simply bent around at A, forcing White to extend to B, etc. How then should he play?


Diagram 11-A



The cut with Black 1 is perhaps an improvement (for the variation with White at C-8 in reply to Black 1 C-7,

(see the next diagram). If the sequence proceeds with White 2 and 4 played as shown here it exerts little influence on the two White stones on the right, and Black cannot be satisfied with this.


Diagram 11-B



The best alternative is for Black to make a squeeze-play directly up against the White stone. Then, if White extends with White 2, he employs Black 3 and 5 as sacrifice stones and continues with Black 7 and 9. By this forceful order of play he can exert an enormous influence on the two White stones.

Also, even if the sequence should proceed as follows: Black 1 D-8, White 2 C-8, Black 3 E-7, this is still very different from that of diagram 11.


Diagram 12



In this case Black might play at A, B, or C. The problem is, which of these points should he choose?

Since a play with two or more purposes is always better than that which has only one the best play here is at C, for this also implies the invasion at D. However, if White were reinforced by a stone at E or in some other way, then Black should hold back with a defensive play at A. Coming into contact with a strong enemy position is the cause of many difficulties and never yields a single profit.

Diagram 13



The Effect of a Black Stone at M-3. (That is, at C on

the Preceding Diagram)


This diagram shows the powerful invasion beginning with Black 1 and the sequence which follows, if White plays elsewhere after Black plays at M-3.

Note carefully how these plays up to Black 7 have White at his wit's end.

The following variation also leaves Black with a satisfactory posture:

White r K-2, Black 5 K-4,
White 6 H-2, Black 7 J-2,
White 8 J-1, Black 9 J-4.

Diagram 14



As noted already, in the situation shown here the strongest course for Black is to approach the White formation with Black 1 which aims at the invasion at A. In this case the best policy for White is to jump to White 2. This play prepares him for the Black invasion at A and at the same time implies a White counterattack at B. Thus like Black 1, it is valuable in that it serves both for attack and for defense.

If it happens that Black has no reinforcing stone at D-6, White 1 might be quietly played at C as shown in the following diagram.

[TN. This term refers to those plays which superficially appear to be defensive, but which in fact are charged with a much more obvious offensive power and intent.]

A 10x10 grid with points plotted at (1,4), (3,4), (5,4), (7,4), (9,4), (1,2), (3,2), (5,2), (7,2), (9,2), (7,1), (8,1), and (9,1). The point at (5,2) is labeled 'A'.


The exchange: Black 1, White 2 is a bit of technique commonly used to rob White of his base, but naturally it also may or may not be suitable depending on the surrounding conditions.

- (1) Where, Black already has a stone in the neighborhood of A, or where the circumstances permit him to play there before White can do so.
- (2) Where, although White already has an extension in the neighborhood of A, Black either has not invaded the White area or cannot hope for any good results from such an invasion.

Where, White has an extension somewhere around A, but Black still wishes to invade the white area.


Def: *Kosumitsuke* is the diagonal extension from a kindred stone directly against an enemy stone.

Diagram 16-A




Here the exchange Black 1, White 2 results in the White formation becoming heavy, and with the following play, Black 3, Black simultaneously attacks White from both flanks and spreads his influence over the entire left side.

Diagram 16-B



If Black 1 simply makes a squeeze play on the White stone there is room enough for White to occupy a base by means of the sequence of plays shown here up to White 6. Alternatively White 2 might be used at A, Black 3 as before, and White 4 at B. Again, even if Black makes the squeeze-play at C only two spaces away from the White stone there is still room for White to develop an active formation with the above sequences, or to jump to the three-three point in the corner.


Diagram 16-C



Here White's extension being only of two spaces it is too narrow to invade. Therefore, not only is there no reason why the *kosumitsuke* of Black 1 should be unprofitable, but it has the good effect of leading White into an over-concentrated formation with White 2.

That is, judging the effect of the play up to White 2, White would wish his stone on the left to be one space farther away at A.

Diagram 16-D




Here it is obvious that the exchange Black 1, White 2 is profitable for Black.

Note: When White already has some strength at or near C, leaving no room for the Black invasion at A, then the *kosumitsuke* with Black 1 is correct.


A 10x10 grid with numbered points 1 through 8. Point 1 is at (8, 2), 2 at (7, 3), 3 at (5, 2), 4 at (4, 2), 5 at (5, 3), 6 at (5, 4), 7 at (6, 4), and 8 at (6, 3). There are also unnumbered points at (2, 5), (8, 5), and (8, 6).

Diagram 17



Note 2: If White used his fifth play to cap the Black stone in the center by playing at B, Black could either answer quietly at C or choose the forceful play Black 6 L-5; both are good and he is sure to reap a profit either above or below.

Diagram 21




On Whether to Attack or Cling to One's Profits

Let us study the counter-measures to be followed when an opponent comes in to the three-three point after *kosu-mitsuke*.

The problem here is whether Black should play at A, away from the White 1 at the three-three point, or hold on to his existing gains by pinning down the White stone with a play at B.

Generally speaking, if Black wishes to attack the White group on his left he should strike at A, away from White 1. If the White position is strong it is wise for Black to pin down White 1 by a play at B, and allow him to connect.

Diagram 21-A




If Black 2 is played downward White's play from White 3 on is strong; the sequence shown here up to Black 14 is one variation. However, it cannot be denied that it results in the debilitation of the White group to the left, and if Black already has a stone at or near A then White's plan in playing White 1 at the three-three point is certainly impossible.

Note: If Black wants to take *sente* on the right side he can play Black 8 R-8, then after White plays at B he can turn back to the attack on his left.

The counter-measures employed in diagrams 21-B and C when Black 2 is used to contain White 1 and White 3 slips under the Black stone at P-3 are well known, but next let us compare their relative merits.


Diagram 21-B



With regard to the gains in the corner and a formation capable of making eyes, this sequence is more profitable and sounder than that of diagram 21-A.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that permitting White 7 may lead White on to play at A or B against the Black stone, providing him with the clue to extending his power toward the center or the right side.


Diagram 21-C



One of the defects of this sequence is that if a Black stone is added in the region of A Black can aim at the weak point B.

Therefore the following sequence may suggest a good approach [for White] in such cases: hold the exchange White 5, Black 6 in reserve, then if Black attacks White is prepared for the plays Black at B, White at C, Black at D, White at R-2.

Diagram 21-D



In this fixed form once again there are dangers to beware of since it leaves the possibilities of an attack at A and of the White raid illustrated here. You should also keep in mind that a Black 1 in the following diagram defends in advance against the White raid on the corner, and that although White can check it by White 2 P-1, Black can then take *sente* by playing Black 3 at S-2.

Diagram 21-E





Diagram 22




On Choosing to Slide Under the Stone at the Four-Four Point.

When Black replies to the attack of White 1 with the one-space extension of Black 2, the form shown here in which White slips under the stone on the four-four point with White 3 and then extends with 5 has recently become popular.


The reason for selecting this standard form is that if the exchange - White 3, Black 4 were omitted and White simply extended with White 5, Black would instantly take advantage of the *kosumitsuke* at A, and yet if White were to make the wide extension to B this would leave behind the invasion point at C.

Diagram 23



The same sequence is also good for White in answer to the Black 2 (*kogeima*, or small knight's play), shown here, and indeed one has the impression that this White 3, and 5 may have become the usual form in this case.


Diagram 24



However, when Black 2 is extended one space farther, (*Ogeima*, or large knight's play), White 3 becomes a questionable play. In the preceding diagrams the extension with Black 2 was narrow and White was equally satisfied, but here Black's extension is one space wider and its effect cannot be denied.


Therefore when Black 2 is played as shown here, one values more highly the variations where White 3 is played at A, Black 4 as before, and White then cuts at B, or where White 3 is used to invade the corner directly by seizing the three-three point.

Diagram 25




When White uses his third play simply to extend two spaces, the exchange - Black 4, White 5 may be forced on him. As explained above, the sequence, White at A, Black at B, then White 3 has come into common use as a means of avoiding this development.

Diagram 26



Thus it has become the established opinion that if one is simply going to extend in such cases, the three-space extension is the minimum. If Black plays at A, White can always shift to B, and since the stone at White 1 is of relatively slight significance a three-space extension also is possible.


Diagram 27



This sequence is unattractive because after White plays 1 and 3 his opponent may break into his extension with Black 4; there is no longer room in the corner for him to transfer there and his formation becomes a heavy liability.

If the two stones of the extension are already in position and White is to play at Q-2 previous preparation with a White play at or around A is necessary.


Diagram 28



When, as in this diagram, Black is at work on a major conception which involves the entire width of the board, he permits the opponent to play White 5 in answer to Black 4 because his own play is a counter-attack against a White extension at A, appropriately delivered just at the time when this extension has become most desirable. That is, he yields the three-three point to White 5 and contains him with Black 6 and 8 in order to concentrate on developing his plans for the lower side and center of the board.


Also, if White escapes the containment by using his fifth play at B, his opponent can occupy the strategic three-three point with Black 6, and the work of Black 4 in blocking White's extension becomes brilliantly effective.

Diagram 29



It is also possible to push forward the White 9 of the preceding diagram to S-6, but then in answer to Black 10, White 11 cannot be omitted, or Black will play at A.


Diagram 30



The abrupt cutting off of White 1 by playing Black 2 directly against it is generally a reckless play unless there is the prospect of definite profit on the other side (that is, on the left in this diagram). The sudden loss caused by provoking the *sente* play White 7 is unimaginably large.

It is of course common sense to answer Black 2 with White 3 as shown here. It should be kept in mind that the sequence of this diagram may be used only under special conditions.

Diagram 31



The unreasonableness of Black 2 becomes more and more obvious. The farther away from the corner one moves the more power develops in the outburst of White 1.

The standard formula is to play Black 2 at C-4 as shown in the following diagram.

Diagram 31-A





Diagram 32



Black 2 becomes appropriate only under the special conditions shown here.


Note: In actual combat it is even better to play Black 6 at T-2.

As the reader is aware, in answer to this double attack, an alternative to Black A is to slip out diagonally with Black 1 as shown here. When White 2 takes the three-three point it is common sense to contain him with Black 3 played from the quarter which can be made into territory in the future. In this case, Black 3 was played as shown because of the Black stone at K-3, but a problem concerning one of the vital points of *go* is involved here and Black's power will be decided by his play from this point on.

— 74 —

- 75 -


Diagram 36



If White makes a dash outward from his isolated stone at O-3 there is no reason why Black should not welcome it, but if his response to it is unskillful, as in the bad example given here, Black will be badly mistreated.

The sequence up through White 3 is a species of good play, but the cut of Black 4 is rash and results in White connecting with White 5, then joining his groups with plays 7 and 9, so that the situation turns into a trap for Black.

Diagram 37




(Black 5 connects in the *ko*.)

It is also optimistic for Black 1 to strike from this side expecting White 2 N-5, Black 3 N-4 to follow. Instead of this the formation is easily disposed of by White in this

way: White 2 N-4, (holding back Black 1), Black 3 N-5, White 4 M-5, Black 5 O-5, (connects), and White 6 M-3 forming a "hanging connection."

One cannot call this enough for Black.

Diagram 38




(White 8 takes in *ko*, White 12 and 14 connect.)

Black 1 at N-7 - this is the best play.

When White extends on 2, Black 3 crowds in between the White stones O-3 and O-5, if White checks this stone with White 4, Black 5 captures the stone on O-5, which leaves White in a dilemma. If White checks him with White 6, he cuts with Black 7, Black 9 is *atari*, and he keeps White under continuous pressure up to Black 13. Then if he connects with Black 15 it is clear that the management of the nine White stones which have been driven into this foolish shape, and the problem of holding back a Black break through at A are going to fill White's future with troubles.


If after Black 5 White made his sixth play at M-4, a Black play at B would put an end to this attempt.

Diagram 39



When White 1 jumps into the three-three point, the sequence up to White 9 as shown here commonly follows. Black 12 is a correct play, but many people never suspect the Black 10 which precedes it. Worst of all, they even end with the exchange: Black A, White B, but it must be understood that the former is a vulgar bit of profit-seeking and the latter is unimportant.


Diagram 40



One may imagine that Black 10 of the preceding diagram is played because of anxiety over the thrust of White 1 shown above but Black should welcome this since it

results in his expansion on the right in the sequence of this diagram. On the other hand White will have trouble over the defeat at A, and so ultimately his play at White 1 has only about the same value as would the direct extension to B.

Diagram 41



It would be better for Black not to make his first play here but to leave it as a point where he could apply pressure in the future. It is painful for White to permit Black to wall him in with Black 3, but White 2 defends against a Black's attack shown in the following diagram.

Diagram 41-A





Diagram 42




On the Practical Application of Joseki

A "joseki," at the very least, is that form in which the plays of both opponents achieve their maximum efficiency. Locally it is possible to reach something which may be called the best arrangement, but because of the surrounding conditions there are cases where it is not always possible to say that one play is the best, and this fact raises an important problem in the actual application of *joseki*.


In diagram 42 the sequence from White 1 to 15 is a standard *joseki* when the corner is invaded at the three-three point. However, in this case it is unsatisfactory on one point, in that, the strong White position at K-3 prevents Black from developing as much outside strength as he should get in compensation for giving up the corner.

Diagram 43



It is appropriate in this case for Black 1 to slip under the White stones. Following White 12, Black 13 encloses a great area and White is left with too much of his force on the left side.


Diagram 44



To Cut or to Allow to Connect

When White 1 takes the three-three point, Black 2 puts a barrier beside him, and from that point on to Black 10 this is a common *joseki*.

Diagram 45



It may also be a good plan to restrain White 1 with Black 2 as shown in this diagram, permit White to connect and then move toward the large area at the bottom of the board with Black 6, but the problem is, what is the clue by which we can decide whether to cut or allow one's opponent to connect?

- A. When one wishes to reach K-3 ahead of one's opponent and to move into this large area with a play having some bearing on the lower right corner.
- B. When White has a stone such as the one at C-9 for instance, so that the extension from his strong base in the corner is too narrow, Black 2 is sometimes played, and if there happens to be still another reinforcing White stone around A, the significance of Black 2 will become even greater. On the contrary however, if there should be a Black stone at B, Black 2 must be considered a bad play.

Diagram 46




Diagram 47





Diagram 46 shows a cut and diagram 47 a standard form of connection. The problem is to make one's choice of these forms according to the surrounding circumstances.

In diagram 46 if Black has an extension to his right, then from the standpoint of balance in his forces it is better that it should be at B rather than at A, and still better at C rather than at B, that is, the wider the stronger, and an extension such as that at A is too narrow to cover his needs.


In diagram 47 one cannot make any sweeping statement about the relative merits of an extension to A, B, or C, but it is a fact that the wider the extension the more room it gives to White to manoeuvre in. This is one of the factors which must be weighed in deciding whether to cut or permit his opponent to connect.

Diagram 48




When White already has a stone in position such as the one at K-3, allowing him to connect as in this diagram will not only give him his gains in the corner, but Black's line of development will also be blocked; thus it is clear that Black's idea in playing 4 and 6 is not profitable.

Diagram 49




Therefore when Black decides to use Black 4 to prevent the connection of the White stones, as in this diagram, he will be content to shift to the left side with Black 8 in answer to White 7. That is, when the White stone at K-3 is strong, it is exceedingly regrettable that with one more play at A it can connect, but when it is isolated it is also possible for Black to turn and attack it, using Black 8 at A and so cutting it off from the other White Stones.

Diagram 50



One must be careful about roughly restraining White with Black 1 as shown here because of the danger of the cut with White 6.


Diagram 51



Naturally the circumstances on the left side of the board must be carefully considered in addition to those at the bottom when deciding whether to cut or to permit the connection. When the White stone at F-3 is isolated as it is here we have a typical example of the conditions justifying the cut. Black's strength on the right reinforced by Black 2 and 4, acting in conjunction with the high squeeze-play at a three-space interval of his stone at K-4, promises a splendid position of wide-scope on the right side.


Therefore in such cases the White penetration of the corner at the three-three point itself becomes a dubious play.

Diagram 52



Even when there is a White stone at or near K-4, White's entire position on the right side is weakened by the cut, and black 4 and 6 may inspire the admirable conception that a heavy attack on White here may lead to profit all along the line.


Diagram 53



It is not possible to expect that the cut will yield any good results on the right when White has such a strong position as that shown here, nor can there be any profit in the adversary overrunning the left side of the board. Therefore it is better for Black to restrain his opponent with Black 4, permit the connection and turn to some other important point with *sente*.


In this diagram the result of the sequence up to White 7 is that White shows signs of overconcentration of effort on the right side and Black probably feels secretly satisfied.

Diagram 54



Even although the White stone at F-3 is isolated, when it is surrounded in too narrow an area as is the case here, Black can capture it and make a little territory but the results of this do not extend far enough. In such cases also it is better to take *sente* by means of the standard form shown in the preceding diagram.

Diagram 55




Some Higher Strategy

The limited invasion of White 1 before enclosing with White 3 is what is called an exploratory play and its use is a matter of higher strategy to try to determine the next play according to the adversary's response.

The usual answer to White 1 is Black 2. White 3 is a reasonable defensive preparation against a Black invasion at A, but the order of play has a special charm for the consequences of the exchange White 1 Black 2 still reverberate in the corner.


Diagram 55-A



For example, White can play downward with White 1 at the first opportunity and ruin Black's corner by making


a living group there with the sequence shown here up to White 5.

Diagram 55-B




If a White stone should be added at A then the White 1 shown here forces his adversary to play Black 2. White lives in the corner by means of the sequence up to White 9 and the Black group then is within the White formations.

Diagram 55-C



If Black 2 strikes directly at White 1 as shown here and the sequence continues with White 3 and Black 4 White's manoeuvre is completely blocked, but observe what would happen if in answer to Black 2 White played his third stone at A (See the following diagram).

Diagram 56




Here White 3 is played as suggested as in the preceding diagram. The sequence from White 5 through White 9 is hypothetical but at any rate the results of this course are that White's plays on the lower side of the board are all highly effective and the Black invasion is neutralized.

However, if White 1 were used simply for protection at A and White later invaded the corner at R-5 then Black 2 played directly against this White stone would be proper. After these plays White 3 would be awkward because of its redundancy.

Please keep in mind this procedure of using White 1 to investigate a situation.


Diagram 57



Key Points of Attack and Defense

As noted before, in reply to White 1 the attack of Black 2 backed up by his position in the lower right corner leads White on to play White 3 and Black then follows with Black 4. This is all correct play. White 5 and 7 also are one type of defensive play but with only his group as it stands here White has not yet completely solved his problem. Therefore let us examine the key-points of attack and defense in the mid-game battle.


Diagram 57-A



The key point of the defense is to play White 1 directly against the Black stone, and in reply to Black 2 the counter-cut with White 3 is an adroit play.

If Black 4 threatens to capture this sacrifice stone White uses it to profit by White 5 and 7. In this way White is sure to get a group capable of forming eyes and also keeps *sente*. If Black 6 is used at L-1 to capture the sacrifice stone, White 7 M-3 forces Black to connect and when White 9 J-2 is played Black must repair the gap at A after all.

Diagram 57-B




If Black counterattacks with Black 4 White profits through the sequence from White 5 to 9.

Again if Black uses his fourth play at K-4 White will come out ahead in the following sequence: White J-3 Black L-4 then White M-2.

Whatever way the situation is handled White's success is due only to the good effects of playing White 1 K-3 against the Black stone at L-3 and of his counter-cut with White 3 L-2.

Diagram 57-C




The Enemy's Key Point is One's Own Key

This same point, K-3 is also the most valuable for a Black attack. At first glance Black 1 K-3 may seem like a slack or careless play, but notice how this single play suddenly enfeebles White, sets the foundation of his group adrift and aims a spear-point at A.

If Black, too eager for success, uses this play at B, the only result is that White can reply at C, which leaves a White play at D as a future threat.

Diagram 58 and 59




Different Ways of Receiving an Attack on the Ikken Shimari

In each of these diagrams the formation closing the corner, in contrast to its powers of development, suffers from the same weak point: it can be threatened by the White stone on the side since there is room for White to run under the Black formation with White 1 and ruin the value of the corner.

Of course this does not imply that the *ikken shimari* formation is unprofitable.


But now let us consider this as a local problem studying Black's reply to the attack according to the difference in the two formations, and try to grasp the vital point in the ways of receiving the attacks.

Diagram 58 A




First, speaking of blocking the White attack directly with Black 2 D-2 it is a great mistake to believe that this is a rigorous play. The formation obtained here with Black 4 C-2 is unable to save the situation after White 5 E-3. The rare case where Black shifts his force by using Black 4 to cut at E-3 is another question.

Diagram 58-B




The correct reply to White 1 is the *kosumi* play Black 2 D-3. If Black answered at A instead White would play at D-3, which is a nuisance for Black.

Diagram 58-C




If, after Black 2 D-3, White should crowd into the corner with White 3 C-2, the sequence shown here leaves White in *gote*, therefore his invasion scarcely gains him anything.

Diagram 59-A




The correct reply to the large knight's jump (*Ogeima*), is Black 2 C-2.

Diagram 59-B




This sequence shows what Black can aim at after playing Black 1 C-2 (i.e. Black 2 of the preceding diagram). If White played at F-3, Black would play at G-3, then after White 4 G-4 Black 5 H-2 would follow.

Diagram 59-C



Here Black 1 D-3 is unattractive because it allows White to watch for his chance to prepare himself with White 2 F-3 and then invade at A. However it cannot be quite ignored since it is one possible way of receiving the attack.

Diagram 60




Concerning Light and Heavy Plays*

Up to the sixth play this is the common *joseki* which uses a high attack at a one-space interval. If Black 5 were used for a squeeze-attack from K-3, White could play at A, a form which does not appeal to Black.

White 4 is especially significant as a foundation for the White extension to K-3.

Diagram 61




If one assumes some Black strength on the flank toward which White wishes to extend, as shown here, then the connection with White 4 must be called a heavy play

since it only invites further attack. The clumsiness of this play becomes obvious if one compares the situation here with that of the preceding diagram noting that this is what could happen there if White had intentionally used his sixth play elsewhere.


Note: In their Japanese context these words imply a distinction much like that between a skilful thrust with a rapier and a clumsy blow with a club.

Diagram 62



Heavy stones, whether abandoned or not, may constitute a primary factor of weakness by inviting a concentrated attack. Generally speaking, one must move delicately within an enemy's sphere of influence, and you should grasp the secret of slipping out with White 4 O-6 as shown in this diagram.


That is, since it is most difficult for White to try to seize the initiative in this area with his inferior strength, he deftly forms a knight's connecton with White 4 O-6, which also contains the implication that a play at A may follow. This is very free and interesting play.



In the sequence shown here, Black's position is too low, and if Black 2 were used to cut at A, White would attack this stone from the outside with White 3 at B and be very happy to throw away the White stone at P-4.

When you are able to grasp the spirit in which White 1 O-6 is played, I think that new realms of possibilities will begin to open to your game.

Diagram 64



A Forbidden Extension


The use of Black 1 as shown here for an *ogeima* "large knight's" extension on each side of the corner handicap stone is known as the "dragonfly-formation". This formation is

generally assumed because it contains the *much* weaker weakness at the three-three point. If White moves at this point and the sequence shown here up to White 12 follows, the *ko*-fight beginning with Black 13 at A, White 14 at B, cannot be avoided.

The damage suffered by losing this fight is immense. Since White would be able to gain compensation elsewhere even if Black should win it, Black ~~has~~ has thirteen play at C. White can live with sente by ~~playing~~ at D, but that is not part of this problem.


If one should say that nevertheless the formation has the good point that Black might be able to close at Q-3 before White launched his invasion, still the small mindedness of Black 1-113 is displeasing.

Diagram 45



The correct course for Black is this, if he wishes to extend, to take up a wide position with Black 1 K-3, and if he wishes to hold back, to withdraw to the corner with a play at A or B.

Diagram 66




Concerning Order of Play

If Black ignores a White approach at M-3 and plays elsewhere, the invasion with White 1 is a very strong play. Against this Black cannot do much better than play against White 1 with Black 2, but the result is unfavorable for him since White gouges out a profit with the sequence from White 3 to White 7 and robs him of part of his base.

Nevertheless, when White plays at M-3, a reply at A, for instance, has little attraction for Black since it does not exert an effect on his opponent's force.


Therefore the situation may be handled as shown in the next diagram.

Diagram 67




Black 1 is pushed into the White group to discover how White will connect. If White 2 connects as shown here, Black 3 jumps out one space; this prepares for the White invasion at A and also implies the direct Black squeeze play at B. Finally, the defect at C is brought about only by the way in which Black 1 was played.

Diagram 68




If White 2 connects on the outside Black 3 cuts. After White 4, Black 5, and White 6, Black 7 takes a profit and keeps *sente* so Black can at last turn to some other large area.

Diagram 68-A



Note; It should be kept in mind that the variation of this sequence shown here is also possible, depending on the circumstances. After White 1, (White 6 in diagram 68) Black can play either at A or at B.


Diagram 69



However, if the order of plays in diagram 68 were reversed and Black simply were to come down to F-2 before thrusting Black 1 into the White group, there is the danger that White might choose the hanging connection with White 2, and, after Black 3 made the cut, follow the sequence shown here through White 6 and abandon his two stones without regret.

The result of this sequence up to Black 7 is that the stone at F-2 has become superfluous, or in other words, Black has incurred the loss of one play as a penalty for his crime of missing the correct order of play.

Diagram 70




Attacking and Defending Ogeima

It is inevitable that the *ogeima*, enclosure of the corner, which does more work than the small knight's move enclosure at A, should be relatively thin defensively.

White 2 is often played quickly in reply to Black 1 because it also serves to reinforce this defect, and if this play is omitted, the attack shown in the following diagram beginning with Black 1 is severe.


Diagram 71



Black 1 strikes at a vital point within the effective sphere of activity of the *ogeima* formation, and if White neglects to answer, Black 3 then threatens A, B, and other weak points.


If White does answer as shown here with White 2 Black may be satisfied with this exchange and turn elsewhere, but it is also powerful play for him to continue immediately with the sequence from Black 3 on, building up a formation on a grand scale across the bottom part of the board.

Diagram 71-A



In this variation, where White pulls back to D-5 with his sixth play, the sequence through Black 9 allows him to cut Black's stones and break out of the corner.


Diagram 72



What happens if White 2 is used to counterattack his opponent's strong approach with Black 1?

The jump to Black 3 is the usual reply, with the sequence through Black 9 following and ending perhaps with Black taking a profit at A. In contrast to this White's play from White 2 onward is clearly feeble.


Diagram 73



If White 4 is used to curb Black, he follows the correct sequence from Black 5 on ending with Black 13, and has handled this configuration easily and well. The cut with Black 9 is very skillful play.


The following diagram shows what happens if White 10 is played at B-5.

Diagram 74




When White 2 connects, Black 9 shuts off the outside of the formation, and when Black, observing the profits obtainable at A and B, attacks with Black 11, the situation becomes unbearable for White.

Diagram 75



This variation appeared in a game between *Go Sei Gen* and *Iwamoto*. It also is one way to handle the problem and should be remembered at least for reference.

Diagram 76




Takamoku and Extension

The seizure of the empty corner, enclosure, attack, and the large areas on the sides come under the general heading of *fuseki*. The problem here is how White should attack when Black intentionally omits playing at A, which is one of the expedients based on the stone at *takamoku**, and instead advances first on the side with a play at B or at C.

Note: *Takamoku* is the D-5 (or E-4) point in the corner.

Diagram 76-A




When Black's development begins at C-10 it is good

play for White to attack immediately at C-4, and in fact it is a mistake not to do so, for if this is neglected Black can then take this point and obtain an ideal formation.

Up to the sixth play, White's response to Black 3 is the usual way of handling the situation, but the extension with White 8 is very interesting since it converts Black 1 into a play lacking in urgency. (Neglect to play White 8 would incur the penalty of a Black attack at A.)


Diagram 76-B



The attack with Black 3 would be considered cunning even for a White player. When White 4 is played against the stone at *takamoku* in the usual way, his opponent immediately plays Black 5, which shows the hidden plot in Black 3, and when the sequence reaches White 18 Black can attack with Black 19. Then in this formation, the presence of Black 1 C-10 alone makes it impossible for White to avoid a loss.

Therefore the counter-plan for White is that shown in the next diagram.

Diagram 76-C




After first playing White 4 he slips over to White 6. The exchange of White 4, Black 5 is a bit unsatisfying for White, but he is content that by his play at White 6 he has reduced Black 1 to a non-urgent play.

It is also possible for White to play elsewhere after the attack with Black 3, since it is not an insignificant gain to have interfered with Black's enclosure while keeping *sente*.

Now, continuing, if Black plays at A, the point is for White to slip away to B, dealing with the situation lightly and delicately.


Diagram 76-D



The problem here is what happens when Black extends on the lower side of the board with Black 1 and White plays at C-4.


After the standard sequence from Black 3 through White 6, if you will observe the effects of the heavy pressure exerted by Black 7 and 9 you will understand that his extension with Black 1 occupies an ideal position. (It does more work than the usual extension to A)

Diagram 76-E




In answer to Black 1 it is appropriate for White to enter the corner with White 2 at the three-three point. From Black 3 to White 10 the sequence is *joseki*, but note how the spear-point of White 10 destroys the effectiveness of Black 1.

Diagram 76-F




If Black plays *kosumi* with Black 3 because of the position of Black 1, the sequence up to White 6 robs the corner of its value, and moreover as the situation stands Black's position on the lower side is not yet established.

Diagram 76-G



If Black 5 is played at D-5, then White can still keep the rewards of coming in to the three-three point by playing 6 at B-6.

Diagram 77




The Effective Use of Reconnaissance Tactics

The ninth rank player *Go Sei Gen* frequently probes with White 1 as the point of a reconnaissance movement preliminary to the reduction of a large territory, and this method of deciding on one's future course according to the enemy's response is high strategy.

The three ways of answering White 1 are, to connect with Black 2 as shown in this diagram, to restrain him by playing Black 2 at the three-three point, or to play at E-3.

If Black connects with Black 2, White seizes the opportunity to push out with White 3, and as the sequence develops from Black 4 through White 13 he overruns the lower side of the board.


Diagram 78



When White considers the sequence of the preceding diagram inapplicable he first caps the Black center stone with White 1, which lends its support to his prospects throughout the right side and also forces Black 2, then strikes root in the corner with White 3. It is also strong play to defer the matter of living with *ko* until White 7.

You should study carefully the model cases shown in these diagrams and learn from them the gist of how this tactic is managed

Diagram 79




In case when black 2 holds back the White stone from the outside White seizes first opportunity to play White 3 at the three-three point, holding back the Black stone at C-4 and pushing into the corner.

Black resists with Black 4 and White follows the sequence from White 5 through White 11, which leaves various suggestive possibilities.

Although the significance of Black 12 is limited to this locality it is an excellent play, and makes impossible for the White group to live. However, by using this group as sacrifice-stones and aiming at the points A and B White can throw Black's prospects in this area into disorder.


Note: Black 10 and 12 are very important. Please confirm that without them there remains the possibility of White living in the corner by means of *ko*.

Diagram 80



If Black 4 connects and White plays White 5 and 7, the situation is that of diagram 78.


Diagram 81



A different policy for White is to attack from the outside with White 3. With the exchange of White 3, Black 4, the corner is certainly lost, but he is content to have limited the size of Black's prospects while keeping *sente*.

Also, when there is a Black extension at A, this play has the advantage of making it possible for White to play at B after Black 4 is played.

Diagram 82



Finally, there is the case when Black 2 is used to curb White from the direction of the corner.

1. When White 3 is played at A, the situation is the same as that of the preceding diagram.
2. There is also the variation where White 3 is used to invade at H-3. If Black shuts him in by playing Black 4 J-4, White reaps the profits in the sequence from White 5 through Black 16.
3. If Black 4 is played at F-3, White can play at H-5 or J-4. (See the following diagram)
4. If Black 6 is used to connect at D-4, the situation is that of diagram 77.

Diagram 82-A






Diagram 83



Although one may speak of the vital points of attack and defense, if careful consideration—that is, analytical power, is not brought to bear, these will not lead to real strength in *go*. Therefore I shall take an example and explain it in full detail at this point.


Against Black's small knight's move extension White invades with White 1 and 3. The sequence which follows, in which White 5 threatens to cut, Black 6 joins, and White 7 and 9 form a connection, is unprofitable for Black.

Diagram 84




As previously explained, this sequence where Black 2 is played against White 1 and Black 4 is played downward is skilful play.

Diagram 85



Continuing from the sequence of the preceding diagram, if White comes out with White 1, Black 2 connects, then following White 3, Black bends to the left with Black 4. At least for reference, note the opposed alternatives at A and B.

Diagram 86




The jump to White 1 is hard for Black to deal with. By extending outward with Black 2 and following with the skilful plays Black 4 and 6 he may feel safe, but to his great surprise the sequence ends in his defeat by White 7 and 9. This is his punishment for the crime of sticking to the strict form and neglecting to make a thorough

analysis of it.

No matter how exactly the vital point of a problem may be grasped, if it is not properly managed with regard to all the surrounding details the matter cannot be brought to a perfect conclusion, and this is part of the charm and depth of *go*.


Diagram 87



Here is a beautiful example which I know actually occurred in a game. This player, noting the danger of the failure shown in the preceding diagram, first prepared by playing Black 2 and 4, next played Black 6 against the White stone, and after Black 8 was quite content to turn elsewhere.

But having finished in this way can his situation really be called absolutely safe?


Diagram 88



Following on the sequence of the last diagram White gradually drew his net tighter, and finally played at G-2.

Even as nibbling this is a large play but, sure of the two White stones, Black cheerfully went on in perfect confidence and once more played elsewhere. At that instant he was dumfounded by the surprise attack of White 1 and 3. Then when Black 8 captured the group of four White stones as shown here, his own group of three were cut off with only one open intersection by a play at C-2 and he was destroyed by the "play beneath the stones"*.

Note : This refers to a sequence of plays visualized as possible at points actually already occupied, but which will become open for play once more upon capture of the occupying stones.



Therefore, in conclusion, when White 1 approaches this formation the answer with Black 2 is good play, and in fact it also gains a large profit.


Again, if by any chance Black plays elsewhere and White plays at B-3, then Black should disregard the corner and play at A. A Black play at B in answer to a White play at B-3 allows White to make the threatening play at C and the implications of this are bad.

CHAPTER III

How To Diminish Large Enemy Territories


An opponent's large territories are just those which lie within his sphere of influence. Generally speaking, to challenge an enemy to even combat at points where one's own strength is inferior to his is to attempt to achieve the impossible by brute force. Still there is the general rule which tells us to "reduce slightly the enemy's" large territory. The means of doing this however naturally depend on the circumstances and one must conduct a careful inspection to discover his vital points without error.

Diagram 1



The problem is just where one should strike to reduce the territory of the formation centered on the corner handicap point with wings pushed outward to the right and left.

Diagram 2




It is often appropriate for White to come into the three-three point immediately.

The sequence from Black 2 to 12 is a standard form, but on observing its effects one sees that the Black stones

at L-3 and R-9 are somewhat lacking in efficiency with regard to balance and strength on the outside. In other words, the reward of White's play through this sequence is that it has led both of Black's extensions into over-congested shapes.


Considering diagram 1 again with these plays in mind, although it is common to play the Black stone at L-3 one line higher at A, or to make a narrower extension as at B, still Black would not be overstraining himself if he extended to C or even farther.

Diagram 3



Here is an imposing formation of five Black stones, and the problem is to find the vital point in this strong position.

Diagram 4




In this case also the best course is to rob the corner of its value by seizing the three-three point.

The sequence up to Black 12 is one example of the close play which follows. Judging from the results shown in this diagram Black's prospective territory might perhaps be thought very large, but of that prospective territory which may actually be considered as his there is about thirty points, and if one subtracts from this the ten White points in the corner, then Black's gain does not exceed twenty points.

To sum up then, the results obtained by the five Black stones of the original formation are not sufficient, and White's success lies in having forced Black into over-concentrating his strength.

Diagram 5




In this case attacks such as the one shown here beginning with White 1 are not good.

Black 2 robs White 1 of its base, and with the exchange of White 3 - Black 4 Black is able to seize nearly thirty points of territory along the lower side of the board with vigorous play incomparably better than that which produced the over-congested formation of the preceding diagram.

In contrast to this the two White stones are seen to be only an invitation to future attacks and a source of loss which cannot be calculated.


Over-concentration of strength or over-congested formations, [*kori-gatachi*], also reveal failure to secure effects proportionate to the number of plays expended.

Diagram 6



How should White play when Black makes a wide extension to R-11?


Diagram 7



In this case it is good play to attack with White 1 as shown here. If Black answers with Black 2 and 4, White extends with White 5; in fact the possibility of making this two-space extension was the reason for playing White 1.

It would be wrong to play White 1 at the three-three point, since Black would inevitably answer with Black 2 at A, thus raising the Black extension at R-11 to its maximum value.


Diagram 8



If Black 2 is used for a squeeze-play against White 1, White will then enter the corner with White 3 at the three-three point. Then, if his opponent checks him with Black 4, he can feel content to ruin the corner with the sequence shown here from White 5 through Black 8.


Also, if Black 4 were played at R-4, White would then extend to Q-3 and invade the lower side of the board, abandoning White 1 as a sacrifice-stone.

Diagram 9



There is no unique way of reducing Black's prospects in the sort of situation shown here; one's play must be carefully selected with relation to the positions of the stones in the lower left and upper right corners. It is a dubious play for White to enter the corner directly at A since this greatly increases Black's strength on the outside, therefore he might consider first capping the Black stone with a play at B, thus forcing Black to play at C, and then invade the corner at A.

Diagram 10




It is also common for White to strike "at the shoulder"

with White 1 as shown here. If Black uses his fourth play to push on at A and then plays at M-2 after White answers at B, very careful attention must be given to the situation in the lower left corner. It is also possible for White to bend around the Black stones by playing White 5 at A.

In the case shown here, however, the play continues through the direct cut with White 7 and 9, and White reaches his objective with White 17.


Diagram 11



One might disapprove of the play proceeding as shown here from the attack with White 1 through Black 2 and on to White 5 because it does not permit the two-space extension as does the similar sequence of Diagram 7. However, this line of play is possible if it is intended to attack the Black stone at K-4 in cooperation with some White strength on the lower left side.


It is also possible simply to play White 1 at A with this same objective in mind. (see Diagram 17)

Diagram 12



How should one open the play against this formation?

Diagram 13




Use White 1 to cap the Black stone at R-10. If Black were making a play to enlarge his prospects he would probably jump up one space to this same point.

If Black answers as shown here, then one must invade the corner with White 3.


The sequence from Black 4 to White 11 is a standard one, but before turning to the next diagram, try to analyze what would happen if Black played at A.

Diagram 14




The only way available to Black for destroying the eyes of the White formation is to play Black 1 and 3 as shown here, but this leaves White unconcerned since he escapes through the sequence from White 4 to 10 which also leaves the cutting-point at A.

Diagram 15



It is also possible for Black to push in directly with Black 6 in answer to White 5. After Black 10, depending on the circumstances, White can choose either to leave the *ko* behind him and play elsewhere, or to live by playing at R-1 or T-3.


Diagram 16



The case when the extension is made on the fourth line.

The examples given up to now show clearly, I believe, that the usual way of reducing a territory of this sort when the extension is on the third line is to cap [the stone at R-10] or to strike at the shoulder of the formation, in other words to attack from above. However, when the extension is on the fourth line these methods are inappropriate—that is, the difference of one line in the height of the extension results in a fundamental change in attitude in approaching these large formations.


Diagram 17



In this case the invasion with White 1 R-8 strikes at the key-point. When the Black stone at Q-10 appears isolated and this White play implies an attack against it the blow is still more appropriate.

When Black attack with Black 2 and 4, White escapes with White 5; then his next objective is to slip under the corner stones at A which simultaneously constitutes an invasion and gains him a profit.

Diagram 18




Here White 5 is used to slip into the corner immediately. If Black plays directly against this stone with Black 6 White pushes on with White 7. In answer to Black 8 White 9 cuts, and thus White has grasped a means of invading Black's territory.

If Black plays at A in answer to White 5, White should defend himself with a play at B.

If Black 2 is played at C to close White in, White can easily obtain a live formation by slipping under to S-4 and S-10.


Diagram 19



When the Black stone at Q-10 is strong, (that is when there are other Black stones on the upper right side) White 1 may be played in reconnaissance at S-5, then if Black answers at S-4, the series of exchanges from White 3 through Black 6 follow. When White extends finally with White 7 R-8, obtaining a base in the middle of his enemy's forces, one may say that the affair has been skilfully handled.


To sum up, the formation on the fourth line places most emphasis on its strength and the important thing is to aim at some defect within it.

Diagram 20



In diagram 20, faced with Black's strong base in the corner plus the stone at R-10 occupying the strategic position on the side it would certainly be poor policy for White to attack at A and thus provoke Black to answer at B.

Diagram 21



White 1 S-5 in diagram 21 penetrates to the vital point of this large area. This is by no means a wild play, and in fact careful observation will show that it is at the pivot-point of the entire Black formation. From this stone White can either play next at A or extend as shown here with White 3 R-8. When Black chooses to defend the corner as shown in this diagram White extends to R-8, if Black chooses instead to play Black 2 at B, White will play at C, and then after Black plays at D, White will ensure his safety by entering the corner at A.

Diagram 22




Diagram 23




Diagram 22 If Black plays Black 2 S-4, White crowds in between the two Black stones with White 3 R-4 and the play up to the extension with White 7 gives much the same result as that of the preceding diagram but what would happen if White 1 were played immediately at the three-three point?

Diagram 23 It is not altogether impossible to go into the corner immediately at the three-three point, but unlike the case where Black has extended to A it is difficult for White to live in these confined corners, and without following the sequence up to the formation of the *ko* with White 7, White would be hard-pressed to form a secure live group.

Diagram 24




Diagram 24 This is a very common formation, both in handicap and even games. For White to play at A, allowing Black to enclose the corner with a play at B would be tasteless.

Diagram 25




Diagram 25 The first idea that comes to mind is for White to enter the corner at the three-three point with White 1. In this case the sequence from Black 2 to 14 is a standard form, but White cannot feel satisfied with this since it results in Black forming a thick wall with great strength on the outside.

However, White could be content with the formation which results if he first caps the Black stone at R-10 by playing White 1 at A, which forces Black to play at B, and then enters the corner at the three-three point. (*cf.* Diagrams 9 and 13)

Diagram 26




Diagram 27




Diagram 26 The case White 1 is played against the Black stone in the corner.

White 1 R-4 is played at the pivot-point of the entire Black formation. If the sequence of plays proceeds as shown here up to White 5, White is more or less content with his formation and one may say that the result has been satisfactory.

Another standard sequence is as follows: Black 4 at A, White 5 at B, and Black 6 at C, after which White plays White 7, R-8.

Diagram 27 Here Black 2 is played from the outside to hold back White and the sequence proceeds as shown here through Black 10. If Black 10 were played at A to hold back White at that point, White would of course make a defensive play at B. In this sequence, please note that simple connection with Black 4 is the best play [at that point]. Also, comparing the results of this sequence with diagram 25, one sees that the narrowness of Black's extension at R-10 reflects the effectiveness of White's play.

Diagram 28




Diagram 29




Diagram 28 The case where the stone at P-10 is added to the Black formation.

When this single stone is added, White's method of spoiling the Black formation must naturally also be changed.

Diagram 29 The play from White 1 to White 5 follows the regular sequence used when there is no Black stone at P-10. When this stone is already there Black 6 can shut White in as shown here. This may be considered no more than just bearable for White, but the result is that he cannot avoid a difficult contest.

Diagram 30




Diagram 30 The case when White 1 is played at the three-three point.

Black 4 is usually used to hold back White at P-3, but this means of holding him in the corner when Black places the emphasis on the right side is also possible and in this case it is the most suitable play.

Please note that it would be dangerous for White to play White 5 at S-2, that is to bring about the exchange shown here as White 11, Black 12 early in this sequence, and then to follow this with the sequence as shown here from White 5 through White 9 because when this point is reached, Black can play downward with Black 10 N-2.

Diagram 31 Sometimes White may sound out Black's reaction to a play at P-8 before going in to the three-three point. If Black answers as shown here White invades the corner with White 3 at that point. If one assumes that the play follows the sequence of the preceding diagram, it becomes clear that the exchange of White 1 Black 2 has had some success in reducing Black's prospects.

Diagram 31






Diagram 32




The case where Black has three stones in a row on the fourth line. Once Black has enclosed the corner at A one cannot play against this.

Diagram 33



What happens when White goes in to the three-three point? It is natural for Black to restrain White with Black 2 C-4. Black 4 F-3 in answer to White 3 D-3 is very interesting. After the reinforcing play of Black 8 the White stones can live even if White plays elsewhere, but later on he may have to submit tamely to a Black profit through the sequence: Black at A, White at B, then Black at C.

Diagram 34




Let us take the sequence of this diagram from White 1 to Black 12, as well as that of the preceding one, as standard forms.

Compared to a Black enclosure of the corner with a play at C-4, the result of the play of White 1 at that point, gaining about nine points and destroying the corner with *sente* , is not small.

In the case shown here the exchange Black 10, White 11 should be played willingly, but note that if the Black stone at G-4 had been at A instead Black could then have deferred a play at this point and simply have played at C-7, which would have left the threat of a Black play at B-2.

For the variation in which Black 2 is used at B to hold White back from the corner see diagram 26.

Diagram 35




Concerning large formations based on the *ikken shimari**

The methods of storming these formations are greatly influenced by the positions of the outlying stones on the upper right and lower left sides, and it is not possible to discuss them exhaustively within the limits of this one diagram, but I shall give the general rules for reducing them.

*Note : Corner enclosure or support as shown here.


Diagram 36



The two common ways of striking at the stone on the third line are by capping it, [i.e. by playing directly above it at an interval of one line] or by a blow at the shoulder as shown here, in which case one answer for Black is to push outward with Black 2, then play the knight's move toward the side with Black 4.

White 5, bending around the two Black stones, is a heavy play but it implies the lighter jump to A or B; in this connection the same remarks apply to a White play at C and the plays following it on the right side.

Diagram 37




Another variation is for Black to play Black 2 below the attacking White stone as shown here. The jump to White 3 is a light play and with White 7 in answer to Black 4 and 6, White has more or less reached his objective of reducing this large area.

In this sequence it is sufficient for White to play at B if Black 4 is used for a direct squeeze-play at A.


On the right side it is good play when White strikes at C, Black answers at D and White pushes ahead to E. When Black plays at F the thing for White to do is to jump to G.

Diagram 38




We have said that one may strike at the shoulder of a stone on the third line but this must not just be blindly memorized; it is necessary to select the play carefully according to the surrounding circumstances. In the example shown here, using White 1 for a blow at the shoulder of the center stone in order to reduce the large territory in the lower right corner is on the contrary, a bad play. Black 2 and 4 are certain to follow White 1, building up an imposing Black position on the left and one must assume that the results will be disagreeable for White.

Diagram 39




In this case also one cannot call White 1 a good play, because it has incurred Black 2 without which White might have a chance to invade at A.

Diagram 40




When the Black stone on the left extends only two intervals as in this case, it is appropriate for White to strike at the shoulder of the center-stone. Here Black 2 is bad not only because it strengthens a point that is not being invaded, resulting in over-concentration of strength, but also without any purpose it results in pushing White 3 toward the center. In this situation it is only common sense to play Black 2 at A.

Diagram 41




In this case also it is correct for White to strike at the shoulder of the center-stone. The White stone at G-3 already stands as an obstacle in the direction of Black's development, and White is unconcerned about the insignificant increase of strength resulting from the addition of Black 2. The manoeuvre of striking at the shoulder is taboo when the opponent has a wide, (three-space or wider), extension on the opposite side, or when his formation contains possibilities for development.

Diagram 42



Concerning the large formations where the Black stones at E-10 and N-3 are added to the formations discussed in the preceding diagrams. If Black should also add a stone at A the problem of spoiling this large area would be a painful one; therefore the situation has become considerably more tense.

Diagram 43




One immediately thinks of striking with White 1 at the shoulder of the Black center-stone. Before the addition of the Black stone at E-10 it was possible for White

to play as shown here or at A, and other points also might have been selected, but once this Black stone has been added, White 1 J-4 becomes imperative.


Also, the two-space extension of the Black stone at N-3 facilitates White's manoeuvre, and, as we have explained previously as a matter of fundamental information, Black dislikes the idea of pushing upward with Black 2 at B. When Black plays 2 and 4 as shown here and White jumps lightly upward with White 5, you should understand clearly that he aims at the invasion of the left side.

Diagram 44



The case of a Black three-space extension to O-3. In the case of the two-space Black extension to A the White blow at the shoulder at B was the best play, but here a White play at B followed by a Black play at C only results in adding to Black's strength. Nevertheless it is intolerable for White to permit Black to jump to D.

Diagram 45




White 1 J-5, a sort of compromise between capping the center stone and striking at the shoulder, presents an interesting way of reducing this large area.

The moment Black answers White 1 with Black 2 H-4, White employs a device of high strategy in playing White 3, C-4 to feel out the situation in the corner. If Black answers as shown here, White first profits with 5, then as the play continues through White 7 and 9 the tide turns in such a way that entire right side is falling into White's hands.


Moreover, there still is left the implication of *ko* in the lower left corner through the sequence: White at A, Black at B, and White at C.

Diagram 46




When Black 4 of the previous diagram is used as shown here (Black 2), to check White in the corner, it is good play for White to proceed immediately with the sequence which begins with White 3. If Black chooses the strong course of shutting White in with Black 4, White ruins the Black territory on the left side by building a live group within it by means of the sequence from White 5 to 15. Although this is a very meandering sequence White is confident of the life of his group throughout.

Diagram 47



This is a very common *fuseki* position where two large forces are pitted against one another and each has an advanced guard on the third line confronting the opponent at a one-space interval. This example provides two problems: how to spoil the large areas and how to enclose them. Please consider what happens depending on whether Black or White makes the first play.

Diagram 48




Let us take up first the case where Black plays first. Black 1 K-5 is probably the most natural play. If we assume the exchange: Black 1, White 2, Black can be perfectly satisfied with his formation since it is wider than that of White, and he therefore comes out ahead in this

exchange of plays.


Note: In this case the relationships between these formations and other stones on the right and left are omitted from the discussion.

Diagram 49



When White takes *sente* sequence shown here through White 5 is good play for him, greatly increasing his territory while it shrinks that of Black. Weaker on the side, White seizes a position in the center and ends with a larger formation than Black. It should be clear from the preceding diagram that it would be unprofitable for White to play White 1 at A, permitting Black to answer at K-5.


Diagram 50



The first method of reducing this large area that comes to mind, that of striking at A at the shoulder of the Black stone at K-3, has already been discussed in connection with diagram 43.


The sequence shown here beginning with White 1 should be kept in mind. Black 2 is necessary, since if it were neglected White could jump in to that point and bring the two adjacent Black stones under attack. White 3 and 5 together are good play and the result of the play up to White 9 is that White has succeeded in splitting the Black force.

Diagram 50-A




Leaving aside the situation in the lower right corner, the sequence shown here may also be considered. White 5 can be made still more effective by playing White at A, Black at B, then White at C.

Diagram 51




If Black, disliking the result of diagram 50, chooses instead the sequence beginning here with Black 8, White will profit on the lower side of the board.

Diagram 52



Here the six Black stones form an ideal large configuration and discovering the means to reduce it presents a painful problem.

Diagram 53




The first thing is to play White 1 P-8. If Black 2 were used at A to try to enclose the White stone, White would then slip in to R-8. Since this gives him the threat at B and a possible reinforcing play at C, his formation could not be easily killed.

However, this line of play would be dangerous without the help of the White stone at R-12 and therefore White 1 P-8 must be made with proper consideration.

You should remember the trick of taking a profit with White 1 and then jumping to the three-three point with White 3. If Black 4 is played as shown here the sequence continues until White plays lightly upward with White 11 M-7. The main point is that this leaves a possible connection at D.


If, after White 11, Black should play at D, this secures him about thirty-five points of territory, but in this situation, White has done as much as he can hope to do.

Diagram 54



If Black plays downward with Black 4 in answer to White 3, White takes a little profit with White 5, then beats a retreat with White 7. Since White may attempt to live by playing at A, Black blocks this with Black 8, and after the exchange White 9, Black 10, the result of the sequence of this diagram is much the same as that of diagram 53.

Diagram 55




The method of using White 1 directly to probe at the gap between the two Black corner stones.

For another explanation of this, refer back to the chapter on "The Essentials of Attack and Defense".

As alternatives to the reply of Black 2 of this diagram he can also connect his stones by playing at Q-4, or check White by playing at R-3. However, if Black 2 checks White as shown here, after the exchange of White 3, Black 4, White leaves the corner as it is and plays White 5 M-8, slightly reducing Black's area.

Since the threat of *ko* is left in the corner because of the following sequence: White at A, Black at B, White at C, Black must sooner or later make an additional play to resolve this problem.


Diagram 56



When Black 2 checks White in the corner, White pushes out with White 3 and threatens to play at S-10 below the Black stone. Black 4 was played with the double purpose of preventing White's escape at A and to defend against a White play at S-10, but by means of the sequence from White 5 through 11 White is able to live and succeeds in ruining the lower right side of the board. Also, if Black 2 were used to connect at Q-4 this would result in giving White the opportunity to choose between the sequences of this diagram and the one preceding.

It goes without saying that the decision as to which one of the sequences of the various preceding diagrams should be played must depend on one's judgement of the actual circumstances of the game.


Diagram 57



The problem here is what measures White should take when Black has a three-space extension on the lower right side.

In the preceding diagram White abruptly probed at the gap between the corner stones by playing at A, and followed the line of play determined by Black's response.

Diagram 58




White handles the situation cleverly by first initiating the exchange White 1, Black 2, then shifting to the corner and playing White 3 against the corner stone. White 5 and 7 in answer to Black 4, followed by the White

9 against the Black stone at R-8 is a consistent line of play, and its effect is shown by the cutting-point left behind at A.


After White 13 Black should reinforce at B and at that time White strengthens the side by playing at C, and thus enlarges his own territory and reduces Black's simultaneously.

Diagram 59



Against White 1 Black 2 is a rather bad play. After the exchange of White 3, Black 4, White 5 is played against the Black stones on the right and Black is perplexed for an answer. After White 5, if Black plays at A, White plays at B; if Black plays at C, White answers at D. Then, because of the trouble raised within his own base in the corner by the presence of White 1 and 3 there Black is at his wit's end to discover what measures he should take next.

Diagram 60



Concerning Two Different Circumstances with Regard to White 1 at the 3-3 Point.

Here the *ikken shimari* forms a base with extensions out to the upper left and to the right. Against this White plays White 1 directly against the corner Black stone, and when the sequence reaches White 11 White's threat of a direct cut at A is severe. Therefore, when Black has a three space extension to the right and this Black stone is faced by a White one at a one-space interval as in this case, White's technique in the sequence from White 1 on may be considered most effective.

On the other hand, however, the Black extension at C-8 on the left side cannot be ignored. Therefore it must not be forgotten that if White dares to play White 1 as shown here Black will be able to capture his stone with

Black 6, and the inevitable result of this is that the space between the corner and the extension to C-8 is instantly so strengthened that White dare not meddle with it.

In cases such as that of diagram 60 White 1 may be considered good because the extension to C-8 is so narrow that there is little room for manoeuvre to begin with, but in that of diagram 61, since it may lose the invasion point at A or B and raise the effectiveness of the extension to C-10 to its maximum it has little to recommend it.

Diagram 61






Diagram 62



Here the Black extension to R-8 is narrow and the alignment of the enclosure of the corner is opposite to that of the preceding diagrams. Let us study the methods of reducing a large territory of this sort.


Diagram 63



First, White 1 begins to reduce Black's area where it is most widely extended. The usual thing when White 1 is answered by Black 2 is for White to play upward with White 3 M-7, (White 7 of this diagram), but here White

uses the technique of making a deeper penetration, playing White 3 and 5 before escaping with White 7. The immediate result is to leave on the board the [possibility of the] White connection by means of the sequence: White A, Black B, White C, and also the hint of a White threat at D.

Diagram 64




When White 1 is played directly against the Black stone in the corner and Black answers by playing downward with Black 2, White 3 then aims at Black's weak point.

In answer to Black 4 White 5 is vital. If Black uses his fourth play at Q-6, White will play at A, directly against the Black stone so that in the end he will eat up the territory on the lower right side. If Black 6 is played at B the following sequence develops: White 7 S-5 Black 8 at C, White 9 at D; you should verify that at this point White 1 begins to make itself felt.


When Black 6 is played as shown here, White 7 against the Black stone on the side prevents Black from expanding his area.

Diagram 65



Against the Black formation with an *ikken shimari* in the corner and an extension at K-3, White launches an invasion at A or B and throws the situation into confusion. This problem really falls under the heading of invasion rather than that of the reduction of large areas but since it is connected with the problems of the *ikken shimari* we will explain it here.

Diagram 66



Black 12 takes the *ko*. Black 18 fills it.

If Black 2 is played at O-3, White will of course answer with White 3, M-5 or L-4.


Even if White should play White 3 N-5 in answer to the Black 2 shown here, Black would play Black 4, N-4 and the end result would be the same as that of this diagram.

Concluding with the sequence from White 19 to 25 White does manage to live with much effort, but more important than this is the problem of what is to come later on. The fact is that while raising havoc inside Black's formation White could not avoid presenting him with tremendous strength on the outside.

Accordingly, when Black already has some strength around A on the right or B on the left it cannot be disguised that this sequence is unprofitable for White since it causes him to lose strength on one side.

It is only when the position is reversed and White already has some stones in one of these areas on the right or left that he should play White 1 as shown here, for in that case Black's strength on the outside cannot develop and the cuts with White 15 and 17 can work effectively.

Diagram 67




The invasion with White 1 as shown here is much the same as that of the preceding diagram, but if there were a White stone at A it would be only commonsense to launch the invasion with White 1 M-3, as in the preceding diagram, because of the threat which comes when White plays at K-2.

Black 2 is the commonest attack, but there is also the variation in which Black plays at N-4, directly against White 1; and when these are both considered unprofitable Black can simply play Black 2 P-3 and drive White out.

White 1 and 3 are parts of a connected design. Black 4 may also be played at P-3 to cut off the White stone, or at Q-4 to connect the two Black stones in the corner. These variations will be discussed in diagrams 68 and 69.


If Black 4 is used to hold White back from the corner as shown here, White follows the sequence up to White 17 and his group is alive. Since Black obtains his compensation by building an imposing wall on the outside much like that of the preceding diagram, it is hardly possible to approve of these tactics for White if Black already has some strength on the right or on the lower left side.

Diagram 68




If Black 4 is used to isolate White 3 in the corner, the play shifts into the sequence leading up to White 13 but it is difficult to judge the relative value of the sequences of this diagram and that of diagram 67. Each of them has one point to watch out for. In diagram 67 it is that White might slip out around Black 6 on the first line to the right, here it is that he might aim at the cutting-point at A. From White's standpoint, White 1 is attractive when the situation holds out hope for one of these aims.

Diagram 69



Connecting with Black 4 is the safest play, and when it seems that the cut shown in the preceding diagram may materialize due to the play of White 13 S-4, Black will of course follow the sequence shown here.


Diagram 70



The large formation based on the *kogeima shimari*, [a "small knight's move" enclosure of the corner]

A White play at A or B might also be considered, but of course there are other ways of playing against the *kogeima shimari* formation to diminish a large area.

Diagram 71




The *kogeima shimari* is strong in the corner but its weakness is that it lacks the power to develop toward the center. Let us consider first the play of White 1 P-5 which directly attacks the weak point of this formation.

From Black's point of view there are usually two choices of play against White 1. If he wants to make the left side secure he will play Black 2 as shown here. What happens when he wants to place the emphasis on the right side is discussed in diagram 72.


When Black 2 O-4 is played it is usual for White to play White 3 and 5, then to follow this with White 7. If Black answers with Black 8, White plays White 9, which casts its shadow over Black's prospects on the right side. If Black 8 were played at that point White would answer at A.

Diagram 71-A



If White dislikes the prospect of Black's playing Black 8 N-6 he can simply make the knight's jump to this point on his seventh play as shown here, and when Black cuts with Black 10, White 11, P-7 just abandons the first three White stones of the sequence.

Diagram 72



Black 10 connects in the *ko*.


If Black responds to White 1 by guarding the right side with Black 2 White plays White 3 against the Black

stone at P-3, and when Black 4 is played he makes a cross-cut with White 5. This is good play in everyday use.

If Black 6 were played at N-3, White could answer at A or at Q-3 depending on the circumstances.


White's reply to the Black 6 shown here is to play White 7 and 9 and abandon White 5 as a sacrifice-stone. If Black cuts at B following White 11, White of course puts his formation in order with a play at C.

Diagram 72-A




However, if Black plays Black 1 at this key point (C of the preceding diagram) immediately, the sequence shown here may be considered. You should note that the result of this sequence is that if in the future Black should lose his connection to the left, then a White play at A is implied.

Diagram 73



The main point here is that if Black cautiously plays Black 4 Q-3, White does not cling stubbornly to White 1, and when he plays White 5 it menaces the Black stone at J-3.

Diagram 74



It is also possible to try White 1 S-4 directly against the corner stone. The main purpose of this play is to encroach on the right side and in reacting to it Black has many possibilities for consolidating his position on the lower left side of the board. Therefore it is unsuitable in such cases as those of the preceding diagrams where


Black's extension to the left is wide, but it may be used when Black's position is strongly defended by a stone at L-3 as in this diagram, or by one at A, B, etc.

Black has about five ways of replying to White 1 S-4 which we shall now explain.

When Black 2 is played as in this diagram the essential point is for White to make a cross-cut with White 3 leaving White 1 behind as a sacrifice-stone, and to follow White 5 and 7 by playing lightly upward with White 9. This is a method which you should learn.

White 9 used at C or elsewhere in order to connect produces a heavy or clumsy shape; those White stones following White 3 have served their purpose and it is not necessary to worry about the cutting-points at D and E.


Diagram 75



If Black chooses to play Black 2 adjacent to his own stone, the point for White then is to play White 3 over the Black stone at R-10, leaving the corner as it is and slightly reducing Black's territory.


The effectiveness of White 1 is shown by the fact that through the sequence: White at A, Black at B, and White at C, White has in reserve a way of living in the corner, and Black must use one more play in order to remove this threat.

Diagram 76



When Black 2 is used to hold White back from the corner the squeeze-play with White 3 is an interesting device. If Black 4 were played at A, then White could play White 5 R-5, forcing Black to connect at the three-three point--an intolerable sequence for Black. Therefore Black 4 is simply used to connect and White lightly plays upward with White 5. Black 6 was played to defend against a White play at that point; White 7 holding back Black is also reasonable.

Diagram 77




When Black pulls back into the corner with Black 2,

the invasion with White 3 contains the implication of a play at A. Since this would more or less settle the formation, the function of the exchange: White 1, Black 2, as compared with the simple invasion of the side by a stone at R-8 is obvious. Accordingly it is only natural for Black to play Black 4 as a barrier, and thereupon the jump to White 5, frustrating Black's prospects in one direction, is in the correct order of play.


Note: The possibility of White slipping around the Black stone to A immediately also exists, but then Black can initiate pressure-plays beginning with a play at B and so establish a greatly expanded formation to the left; therefore the time and circumstances for this must be chosen carefully.

Diagram 78



Black 2 at the four-four point is also often used. In that case, White plays White 3, keeping in mind the possible extension to A. When his opponent plays Black 4 as in this diagram White turns aside and plays White 5, R-8.


Diagram 79



The large formation based on the *ogeima shimari* [the "large knight's move" enclosure of the corner]

There are various methods of reducing this.

Diagram 80




When the Black forces are roughly equally balanced on the right and left a common method of reducing this large area is for White to cap the Black stone at O-3 by playing White 1 as shown here, this being the pivot-point of the formation. This point is also equally important for Black when he is able to play there.

If Black defends the right side with Black 2, the cor-

rect sequence for White is first to play White 3 Q-3, then turn and invade on the left with White 5. However, this play is complicated by the possibility of two "ladders", one of which may develop from White 13, the other from the alternative sequence: White 5, Black 6 N-4, White 7 at A, Black 8 at B, White 9 at C. These need careful study and when they are found to be disadvantageous White 5 will be played at C.


We omit investigation of the consequences of simply playing Black 8 at P-2 since this problem has already been treated.

Diagram 81




When Black decides to defend the lower side of the board against White 1 by playing Black 2 M-4, the natural course for White is to make the light play White 3, to try to reduce Black's area on the right side. Since this play also threatens one at A, Black must defend himself by a play at B or at some other point.

Diagram 82



The case of the large area where the lower side is strongly defended and the extension on the right is relatively narrow.


Diagram 83



The tactics shown here are a bit heavy-handed, but the use of White 1 for a direct blow at the shoulder of the Black stone at O-3 is interesting. Black's play from Black 2 to 6 is obligatory, and when White puts his formation in

order with White 7 or a play at A, he has reached his objective of reducing the Black area.


Diagram 84



The case of the large area where Black's defence runs from the right across the lower side of the board.


Here the invasion of the more open right side strikes at the vital point. However, if the Black extension to R-10 were but one line narrower this play would be inappropriate. This is because the invasion with White 1 is justified by the width of the possible extension toward R-8 in case Black should reply to it by defending the corner with Black 2 P-4. White's play from White 3 to 7 in answer to Black 2 contains the implication of a White play at A. For the reaction to this, refer to the chapter on "The Essentials of Attack and Defence".

Diagram 85



The *ogeima* formation reinforced by a stone at O-5 and with an extension to R-10. The blow at the shoulder of the stone at R-10 by a White play at A is very sensible, but in this case we want to consider a still deeper penetration.


Diagram 86




White 1 S-4 is a tense play made to reconnoitre the situation in the corner. If Black draws back with Black 2, White invades the right side with White 3 which can be followed either by an escape at A or by slipping around the two Black stones in the corner with White 5. This line

of play follows the same course as that discussed in the article on the *kogeima shimari*. If Black 4 is played as shown here to shut in White 3, once again White has in mind two means of getting past this difficulty—he can come out at B or make a “crawling” play at C in the corner. If Black 4 is played at D, White will of course play White 5 at A or at Q-9.

Diagram 88



If Black 2 is played to hold White 1 back from the corner, White 3 forces Black 4, then White extends with White 5. White 7 in reply to Black 6 is intended to lead to a formation capable of making eyes and also for an escape.



Here White's tactics in the play from White 3 on provide an example of the exploitation of a sacrifice-stone to the very last degree. The White stones in the sequence up to White 7 act in the role of forcing plays and it is only after White 9 strikes at the shoulder of the Black stone at R-10 that their function begins to be marked.


If Black 2 were used to extend to R-5, White has in reserve the possibility of playing White 3 at the three-three point and forming a live group; thus even if he does not carry this out immediately he succeeds admirably in his project of reducing Black's large area.

CHAPTER IV

The Analysis of the Relative Values of Plays

Both in *fuseki* and in local manoeuvres as well each contestant must consider most carefully whether or not there might be some defect or something lacking with each individual play. This naturally demands an analysis of the relative value of plays to discover whether or not a given play displays the maximum of efficiency with relation to the opponent's stones, and familiarity with this method provides the only logical means of verifying that fact.


Diagram 1



The Analysis of the Tsukenobi Joseki

The dubious value of Black 8 in this *joseki* has already been explained from another angle at the beginning of the Chapter on "The Essentials of Attack and Defense", but if one attempts to analyze it scientifically according to the principle involved in judging the relative values of plays one is led to still clearer conclusions.


Diagram 1-A



The formation in which White 1 attacks the corner stone, is answered by Black 2 on the fourth line, and then extends three spaces with White 3.


This pattern is in common use in actual play.

Diagram 1-B




Here, by playing Black 1 against the White stone at Q-3, then extending upward with Black 3, Black is just piling error on top of error since this not only represents over-concentration of strength but has the effect of solidifying White's three-space extension, exactly as in diagram 1. It should be clear that it is better for Black simply to close at Q-3, leaving the threat of a Black invasion at A.

Diagram 2




Here, although Black 2 and 4 strengthen White, Black's compensation lies in the large area foreshadowed on the right side; therefore extending with Black 8 to the point below the center handicap point as in this diagram in order to reach this objective is in line with the ideas of modern *go*.

Diagram 3



Even when White strongly defends himself with White 7 as in this diagram, (or by a play at A), it is better to play Black 8 R-10. Thus, when White comes out with White 9, Black plays the relaxed sequence from Black 10 on and without strain secures a solid profit on the right side. It can be verified by analysis that the result up to Black 14 is profitable for Black. See diagrams 3-A & B.

Diagram 3-A




Study of this diagram reveals the following facts:

- 1) That in this formation, in contrast to White's strength on the outside Black has the material gain.


- 2) White has played into Black's hands by pushing his development on the fourth line along five stones in a row.
- 3) That White is not making enough practical use of the strength he obtained on the outside as a result of his efforts. That is, his extension with White 2 is much too narrow from a base of four stones, and with this formation it should be pushed out at least to A if it is to pay.

Diagram 3-B



This is the preceding diagram with two White and two Black stones added. Although the exchange here is clearly adverse for Black, since this is essentially a strong White area it exerts no influence on the general trend and cannot be compared to White's loss in uselessly strengthening Black on the right side.


Diagram 4



The formation in which White makes a double attack uses the *tsukunobi* manoeuvre.

When White pushes out with White 9 Black does sometimes block this by playing at P-5, but if he follows the more relaxed course shown here from Black 10 on then the single stone, White 1, is finally left isolated within the Black formation; therefore the reward of Black's tactics are greater in this case than in that of diagram 3. Each contestant has invested eight plays in this area, but White's first play is found in the end in an irrelevant position: thus it is seen that White has wasted one play for nothing and his loss is mathematically demonstrated.


Diagram 5



In this formation Black 1 makes a White push outward

at A urgent at the same time that it loses the invasion point at B; therefore, as we have explained previously, this is a very bad play for Black. Now see the next diagram.


Diagram 6



When White's formation to the left is solid as in this case, leaving no room for manoeuvre, the cut with Black 1 is an interesting play. By using Black 1 and 3 as sacrifice-stones, Black 5 becomes an *atari*; then Black 9 can be played with *sente* to repair the defect in Black's wall on the right, and thus Black is able to complete the foundation work for a large area.


If one attempts to decide by means of an exact analysis of the plays whether or not this manoeuvre should be employed and assumes that the two Black stones 1 and 3 and the two White stones 2 and 10 cancel each other out of the reckoning then the result becomes clear. That is, disregarding Black 1 and 3, we consider only the exchange Black 5 and White 6 and the fact that Black 9 would have been necessary sooner or later to defend against the threat of White pushing out at that point. In this way it is obvious that Black's skillful use of sacrifice-stones has made it possible for him to enclose the boundary of his area completely by playing Black 9 with *sente*.

Diagram 7




Black strikes at the shoulder of the White stone at the center with Black 1, counting on extending his strength on the outside with *senze* through the sequence from White 2 to 6. However.....

Diagram 8



When White answers Black 3 with White 4 as in this diagram, Black is forced to make the *gote* play, Black 5, against his will. The best sequence for Black therefore is that of the following diagram.

Diagram 9



The best play for Black at this time is simply to use Black 1 directly against the White stone at N-4; White is then forced to connect with White 4 and moreover, from the standpoint of the analysis of the relative value of plays there is a difference of one play compared to the preceding diagram. There is some difference in the formation on the lower side of the board but after White 4 if Black should extend to A (which is not an urgent play for him), then the result is that of diagram 8. In this case Black would probably play elsewhere, preferring to anticipate White in seizing some other good point; then if White should cut at B Black would play at C, White at A, and finally Black would play at D, thus abandoning without regret the stone which had served its purpose.

Diagram 10






Diagram 11




Both diagram 10 and 11 show basic forms of a White attack from both sides followed by an invasion of the corner at the three-three point after Black resorts to the *tsukerobi* manoeuvre with Black 2 and 4. The reason why the variation of diagram 11-A, (the result of Black checking White by playing at A in diagram 10) is not used in *joseki*, can also be explained by the analysis of the relative value of plays.

Diagram 11-A




When Black 10 is played as shown here White gains as a result of White 13, and when the plays, White at A and Black at B are added to this the formation becomes that of the following diagram.

Diagram 11-B



When White invades at the three-three point directly the sequence shown here up to White 9 is in common use; the two exchanges Black 10, White 11, and Black 12 White 13 are not urgent plays and if Black follows them by the error of playing elsewhere with Black 14, then White may bend around the end of the Black with a play at A, forcing Black into the clumsy formation obtained when he answers at B. But this bad result is just the formatinon of the preceding diagram, thus making clear why that sequence is not used in *joseki*.


Diagram 12



The Ogeima Extension


The invasion with White 1 of this diagram is a skillful bit of reconnaissance tact in common use. Against it Black 2 played directly against the invading White stone followed by Black 4 in answer to White 3 certainly seems to produce an impregnable formation.

Diagram 13




The question of the value of the sequence of the preceding diagram can be answered very simply by means of the analysis of play. Here Black 2 is a standard form used in answer to White 1 and is considered to be reliable. The problem then is whether or not Black would make such a stupid play as to add a stone at A.

Diagram 14




It is generally correct to block White 1 with Black 2 as shown here, (see "The Essentials of Attack and Defense"), leaving White able to live through the sequence up to White 7.

Diagram 15




However, by means of the remarkable play shown as Black 1 in this diagram, Black is able to close in the White formation completely; therefore, unless White's position on the outside is too strong, the result is never unfavorable for Black.

Diagram 16



This formation also develops quite commonly from the *ogeima joseki*. When the play reaches White 7 Black finds his formation is left enveloped by the White stones. Therefore from the standpoint of the analysis of play it is clearly much worse for Black than the following diagram.

Diagram 17



After White 1, the sequence as shown here up to Black 6 is a common one. It is more usual to play White 7 at A, but the formation given here is also met with. If one compares this formation with that of diagram 17-A one sees that the result obtained there is only the slight

variation of that diagram 16 resulting from the exchange: White at A, Black at B, and that the stupidity of adding the wart at the end of the formation with a Black play at C of diagram 17 in answer to a White jump upward to B would really be too much.

Diagram 17-A






Diagram 18




Black 4 is a good play, and up to Black 6 the exchange is in his favor.

Diagram 19




Against White 1 and 3 it is customary to play Black 4, C-4, closing in the corner, but when Black wishes to place more emphasis on the center the sequence shown here may sometimes be used. Therefore we shall now investigate what happens when White continues immediately with White 5 and 7, producing the "double-cut".

Diagram 20




I have the impression that many people, following the general rule: "in case of the double cut, extend one side", readily play Black 4 as shown here, then follow through with this sequence up to Black 10 without any regret, but it cannot be overlooked that the analysis of play shows that this results in a loss.

Diagram 21




In this diagram the extension with Black 4 is correct. At the same time, if after Black 10 White should attack at A there would be no reason for defending this strong position with a Black play at B—which shows why the sequence of the preceding diagram is to be considered unprofitable for Black.

Diagram 22



Here Black 4 is played directly against White 3, forcing White to continue on with White 5 into the area where Black himself is strong, and Black then blocks him with Black 6; this is good play and if White plays White 7 as shown here Black connects with Black 8 and gains *sente* . If this sequence is compared to that of diagram 20, one sees that there is a difference of one play, (that is, Black reaches his position using one less play), and thus one can understand why Black is satisfied with it from the standpoint of the analysis of play.


Diagram 23



Therefore, from White's point of view, we shall consider what would happen if he were to make the vigorous play, White 7, followed by White 9.


This results in a White connection through the sequence of plays up to White 11, but since it leaves Black the chance to develop a *ko* by playing at A, White is forced to make a defensive play with White 13, although it costs him *sente*; on the other hand Black has shifted his weight to the left with Black 10 and 12, and there is no room for argument as to which player has come off better.

Diagram 23 A



Let us now analyze the results of diagram 23 a little farther from the standpoint of the relative value of plays.

Diagram 23-B



(White 6 was played elsewhere)

Diagram 23-B shows the development of a hypothetical Black attack on the White stones at D-3 following a Black play at C-5.

It is exceptional for White to be played elsewhere following Black 5, and the idea of playing Black 7 and 9 as shown here is also somewhat doubtful, but let us suppose that the sequence proceeds in this way up to White 10.

Continuing from the configuration of diagram 23-B, it is better not to play out the sequence from Black 1 to White 4 as shown in diagram 23-C, but since it exerts but little effect outside of this formation the fault is a light one. However, the exchange of White at A, Black at B does nothing but strengthen Black on the outside so that a White play at A is very bad. Moreover it also means in effect the suicide of the White stone at C. Thus this play is a complete loss and it is clear that White's counter-attack has come to nothing.

Diagram 23-C






Diagram 24




White's handling of the sequence shown here up to White 11 is based on a secret design to play *ko* at B in reply to a Black play at A.

Diagram 24-A




White is safe if he makes his eleventh play as shown here, but since these tactics are aimed at opening up some new development elsewhere on the board by means of the *ko* it is timid play to forget this and make the hanging connection with Black 12, although one often sees people do this. The following diagrams will make the matter clearer.

Diagram 25




The Black stone at F-3 relieves Black of any future anxiety at that point, and Black follows it by beginning the *ko* with Black 1 and 3. White 4 of course will be played elsewhere as a *ko*-threat.


Diagram 26



This shows the situation following the most complete Black victory in the *ko*-fight. However the value of the Black stone at F-3 is now doubtful. Assuming that the order of play had been different, would Black have made such a play as that F-3 after he had captured the White stones? Thus one sees that because of this weak play Black has suffered the loss of one play.



Here Black dominates the entire region of the lower left side of the board and to prevent him from monopolizing it completely his opponent invades the corner with White 1 at the three-three point. After Black 8, White is free to live by playing at A, but it is usual for him to take *sente* at some other good point. However, this will of course depend on the results to be gained by these tactics determined by the analysis of the relative value of plays.




(White 4 was played as a *ko*-threat)

This shows the configuration resulting from Black winning the *ko* he began with Black 1 and capturing two White stones with Black 3 and 5.

In this case, (leaving aside the problem of what may have been won or lost [elsewhere] in the *ko*-fight), and considering the matter from the standpoint of the analysis of the relative values of plays, the results are as follows; had it not been for the invading White stone at the three-three point the Black stone at D-3 would have settled the situation, and since Black used two plays, 3 and 5, to capture, this leaves the count unchanged so that the balance returns to a loss of one play—which was what White aimed at.

Diagram 29




A Re-examination of joseki.

The form is that in which Black makes a squeeze-play against the White stone from a distance of one interval, and White replies by playing directly against the Black stone, and then extending with White 2 and 4 here.


When Black checks White with Black 11 and White cuts on the outside with White 12, in the opinion given in some books on *go* the variation shown here up to White 16 results in an even division of profits between both players, but when this is reexamined from the viewpoint of the analysis of the relative values of plays it is seen that there is much that is doubtful in this configuration.

Diagram 29 A



This shows the well-known *takamoku joseki* up to White 9.


Diagram 29-B



Here we assume the sequence from White 9 through Black 16 and this bad result is just the configuration of diagram 29. Analyzing the situation one notes that when Black 10 is played, then from the standpoint of the logic of *go* the correct thing for White is to attack this stone from the right flank, thus making use of the position he has already gained up to White 9 for a squeeze-play against the attacking Black stone. Thus it is clear that there is no reason for the over-concentration of White strength from White 11 onward nor for strengthening Black in this

manner. Therefore, since we conclude that the results of diagram 29 are unfavorable for White, the situation should be handled as shown in the following diagram.


Diagram 30



One way is first to attack with White 1 as shown here, forcing Black 2, then continue with a "squeeze-cut" with White 3 and 5. Black would like to play Black 6 at A according to the rule which advises the capture of the cutting stone, but the exchange of White 1, Black 2 has spoiled this.


This diagram does not show any change in the over-concentration of strength represented by the White stones at G-4 and 5, but since Black also displays a certain weakness in that he has been forced to connect with Black 6, one may say that both sides have imperfections which nearly cancel each other out.

Diagram 31



When the "ladder" is profitable to White he may choose the sequence shown here.


Diagram 32



This shows the *joseki* of the high squeeze-play from a distance of two spaces which is now popular.


Black 2 is a reliable play and if White 3 is played as shown here Black follows a cautious policy, handling the sequence from Black 4 to 8 in such a way as to try to leave nothing behind to worry him and intending to play strongly later on. However.....

Diagram 33



White can play White 3 as shown here, and in that case, if the sequence proceeds from Black 4 to 8 as in the preceding diagram it is clear that White 3 is more effective than if it had been played at A. Therefore, since this is unfavorable to Black from the standpoint of the relative number of plays involved, he should handle the situation as shown in the following diagram.


Diagram 34



It is correct for Black simply to slip downward with Black 4, aiming at the attack at A or the invasion at B.

Another possibility might be for Black to play at C, directly against the White stone, which would be followed by the exchange; White at D, Black at E.

Diagram 35 and 36




(In diagram 35, White 3 and 5 were played elsewhere.)

Here is a problem in the analysis of play at the beginning of *fuseki*.

Against the crowding play of White 1 Black uses Black 2 to defend the corner, and when White plays elsewhere twice in succession, Black continues on with Black 4 and 6 as shown here. If one compares the situation in these two diagrams, imagining in diagram 35, the stones White 1 and Black 2 and 4 as omitted, one sees that it would have been immensely better for Black if he had played Black 1 first at H-3. That is, considering White 1 and Black 2 as cancelling each other, Black 4 is still left as an extra play, or in other words, Black has invested one unnecessary play in the sequence and therefore has suffered the loss of one play. It is well known how very important it is in the period of *fuseki* not to fall behind.


Diagram 37



In this diagram, the play of White 1 directly against the Black stone at H-3 is good form and is commonly used after White bends to the left with the stone at H-5. Black's play from Black 2 to 12 is forced, and the result of abandoning White 1 and 5 is that White's position, which was somewhat weak, is now perfectly secure and White has *sente* as well. Note especially that in the configuration of this diagram, White's sequence up to White 7 interferes with the Black development of a large area on the left side, while on the other hand the situation would be vastly different if Black had been able to jump upward to H-5.

Against the White stone at H-5 a Black play at G-4 will give him some profit, but White could be satisfied even with this. However the analysis of play according to the following diagram shows the effectiveness of White's manoeuvre in the play from White 1 onward.

Diagram 38



Here White 1 directly against the Black stone is especially appropriate and the result of the sequence from Black 2 to 12 is that Black's over-concentration of strength becomes intolerable.

If one were to assume a different order of play in which the sequence had proceeded up to Black 12, would a reinforcing play such as one at A then be considered necessary?

Therefore, in this case, against a White stone at G-5, a Black reply with a stone, say, at F-4 is indicated. The following diagrams show by the analysis of play the inner meaning of the sequence up to Black 12.

Diagram 38-A






Diagram 39



In the preceding diagram, White 1 and 5 and Black 4 and 12 cancel each other out so that the effectiveness of White's play is as shown in diagram 38-A by White 1 and Black 2.


Thus, diagram 38 shows that in answer to White 1 a Black play either at A or B in diagram 39 must be rejected and that the best play for him is Black 2 as shown here but the correct judgement of this situation also is to be sought in the analysis of play.

Diagram 40




Here White follows up his attack from C-7 ("the large knight's move attack"), by slipping in under the Black corner stone with White 1. Black is correct in extending to the right with Black 2 thus allowing White to come in to the important three-three point with White 3. This is because after White 3, Black 4, White cannot omit the reinforcing play White 5, for if he does he will of course suffer the damage caused by a Black play at A. If the results of this diagram are compared with those of the following, I suppose it will be clear that from the standpoint of the analysis of the relative value of plays, Black's shift to the right with Black 2 is a skilfully handled manoeuvre.

Diagram 41



Here White uses the "small knight's move attack". In this case White 3 in answer to Black 2 is satisfactory--that is, White achieves his objective with one play less than in the preceding diagram. Therefore, in this case Black 2 at the three-three point would be an excellent play.

Diagram 42




The *joseki* of the squeeze-play at a distance of two spaces when White plays elsewhere.

Here, White 8 was played to test Black's reaction. For instance:


- A) If Black answers with Black 9 G-3, White will play White 10 B-3, aiming at the outside cutting-point.
- B) If he answers with Black 9 G-4, White will choose the exchange: White 10 at A, Black 11 at B, and turn elsewhere.
- C) However, if Black wishes to dominate a large region in the center of the board he will slip in toward the corner with Black 9 as shown here and drive White's force off toward the right. This manoeuvre is in common use. After White 12 the question as to whether Black should simply extend to C with Black 13 or should play at D depends partly on the distribution of the stones on the right side of the board, and partly on the analysis of the relative value of plays.

Diagram 42-A




Note the importance of White 6 for White's tactics in slipping between the two Black stones with White 2.

Diagram 43



When the situation is like that of this diagram it is appropriate for Black to extend with 1 and 3, aiming his spear-point at the gaps in the formation along the right side which White is trying to build.

Diagram 44




When white's position on the right is strong as in this case, the forceful play with Black 1 shown here is attractive for him. Black gains a profit with Black 5 and then, by means of the sequence: Black at A, White at B, and Black at C he can take advantage of the gains which were left to his rear.

In this case, although the play up to White 6 results in strengthening White, his formation along the lower side of the board shows over-concentration of strength, which proves that the sequence is favorable to Black from the standpoint of the analysis of the relative value of plays.

Thus in this way the logical search for sound judgments concerning the relative value of plays fills an important role in grasping the vital points of *go*.

Diagram 45



This example, taken from a professional game, shows the analysis of the relative value of plays extended to cover the entire board.

The upper right corner is a variation of the *takamoku joseki*.

When White plays White 14 Black is content to use the threat of a ladder developing from Black 9 to close in a large area with Black 15.


White 28 was played with the idea of forcing a Black reply at A, after which White would attack the lower right corner, but Black, refusing to submit to being ordered about in this manner, instead closes in the corner with Black 29. This is good play.

White next makes the strong play, white 30, but with Black 31, Black occupies an important point and gains the

dominant position over the whole board.


The result of the play up to Black 31 is that Black has abandoned four stones to White in the upper right corner, presenting him with a gain of more than twenty points, nor can his influence toward the outside be underestimated either; however, in compensation for this, Black has occupied three large regions and holds the superior position over the board as a whole.

Diagram 46



Therefore, when the manoeuvres in the upper right corner are examined by means of the analysis of the relative value of plays it will be seen that it is natural enough that White should hold the superior position there, since he has used nine plays where Black has used only five, an excess of four plays for White, but on the other hand it is clear that Black has put his four (saved) plays to good use at other points of strategic advantage.

Moreover, since there still remains the possibility of profitable Black play at A or B against White's strength on the outside, the four Black stones enclosed within the White formation are like the members of a fire still smouldering behind the White lines and have not died in vain.



If, then, we assume the configuration of the preceding diagram, omitting any questions concerning the four enclosed Black stones, the result is as shown here. In this case White has closed in the corner with two stones at a two-space interval from each other, (i.e. those at Q-14 and Q-17), and to this enclosure he has stubbornly added the stones at P-16 and R-13, making a total of four stones used to close in the corner; and this the real situation in this corner as revealed by the analysis of the relative value of plays.


CHAPTER V

The Development of Intuition

PREFACE

With both contestants engaged in a struggle for the superior position in the whole game, the period of *fuseki* is the training ground for conception and planning. There is in this a sphere of intuition which transcends the ability to analyze local situations. This intuition, however, is by no means a matter of divine inspiration forever beyond the power of the individual to develop. It should not be forgotten that it is the invaluable result of past experience on the board and of the ability to reach penetrating judgments of the general situation.

Diagram 1




White to play.

Here is an unusual *fuseki* in which all four corners have been occupied by the thirty-fourth play. This illustration is taken from a game between the ninth-rank player Fujisawa and myself. This game offers an interesting contrast between Fujisawa's style of play, in which he gives close attention to territory, and my own which does not cling to it so strongly. The problem of course is where White should make his next, and very important, play.

White at A claims a large area, at B he can hold back the Black formation, or he can cap the Black stone on the upper side by playing at C. If White makes his play in an off-hand manner all may be decided in an instant, but if one begins to think about this situation one finds that the board is brimming with fascinating problems.


Diagram 2



At this point of the game the matter of greatest concern is the huge connected prospective Black territory extending from top to bottom across the entire right side of the board, and White must discover some strategy to deal with it.

From a commonsense standpoint the two important remaining points of the *fuseki* are at A and B. However, a White play at A results in raising a Black reply at C to its maximum value, and a White play at B has the same effect on a Black answer at D, therefore Mr. Fujisawa says that he lacked confidence at this point. In the end he selected the White 1 shown here. It might be difficult to argue that this was the best possible play but considering the balance of the whole game it was an interesting idea.

Diagram 3




Black to play. The author is White.

The exchange of plays of this diagram where Black comes out with Black 1 and White makes an enclosing play with White 2 marks a change of phase of the game.

Surveying the whole board one sees that plays affecting large areas seem to have been largely used up on the upper side and on the left so that the possibilities are restricted to the region of the lower right. Considering the problem first from White's viewpoint, the first thing that comes to mind is that if he could add a stone at A or B his extensive prospects throughout the entire lower right area would suddenly become even more imposing, while on the other hand Black's hold on the upper right side shows a certain weakness because of the gap it contains.

What then would your idea be?


Diagram 4



First, Black might consider pressing in all the way to A. This idea is commonly used against White's *ogeima* enclosure of the corner but in this particular case further reflection shows that it is unsatisfactory since White can reply with a play at B and thus confirm his hold on the large area on the lower right side.

My opponent played Black 1 as shown here, leaving most awkward position. If I had played White 2 at M-4 Black could have replied at C, threatening to follow with a play at D—but this is far more painful for White than the exchange of Black at A, White at B. Therefore I played White 2 Q-5 but Black continued with another good play, Black 3 M-4 and with this the weakness of White on the lower right side is suddenly left exposed, for it threatens further Black thrusts at E or at F.

Diagram 5




Black to play.

The eighth rank player Segoe at the age of sixty-one returned to the Nihon Kiin tournaments after a long absence and I was chosen as his opponent in his first game. During the *fuseki* of this game there arose the problem concerning a large area which I discuss here.

Black first jumps upward with Black 1 and White answers with White 2. Thereupon all attention is immediately focussed on the center of the right side, the question being whether to play at A or at B, that is, on the third or the fourth line, which is of especially great significance in this *fuseki*.


A Black play at A invites a White capping play at C while Black at B suffers from the weakness of the gaps along the side, but which of these plays is better?

Diagram 6



In selecting the point at which to play on the right side needless to say the major problem is that of the large potential area in the center. Thus, although Black might choose to play at A, the fear that White might cap this stone with a play at B and so gain a strong foothold for reducing the potential Black area in the center makes this idea unattractive. Therefore I felt that the gaps along the edge on the right side were not important enough to prevent me from playing Black 1 as shown here. In reply to this, after the exchange: White 2, Black 3, White enters the central region with White 4 to reduce Black's area but Black then attacks him with Black 5 and 7. The result then is that the greatly increased possibilities for Black to form territory on the right side, show that Black 1 was an appropriate play.


Diagram 7



Black to play. The author is White.

The jump upward with Black 1 kills two birds with one stone since it confines White in the upper left corner while simultaneously aiming at an imposing formation stretching across the upper side. White 2 is aimed toward this large potential Black territory and also reinforces White in the lower right area of the board. This play cost me much thought and I secretly felt proud enough of it at the time but after reconsidering it later on it seemed like something of a half-measure. Rather, it might have been somewhat more to the point to have used this play on the lower side at A, but if you were Black, how would you now attack White on the lower side? If Black plays at A White's prospective territory becomes too large when he replies at B.

Diagram 8




The major problem on the lower side of the board is how to reduce White's area there. How would it be for Black to play at A? The result of a Black play at A is as follows: White at B, Black at L-5, White at C; this is a common form but in the situation shown in this diagram one would have to resign oneself to the fact that it would become the objective of a White attack.

The next thing to consider is the Black capping play at D. However, if White answers this with White 2 as played here then Black will not be able to play Black 3 against the White center stone as he does here because White will of course follow with White 4 at A and Black would lose out in the resulting ladder.

In this case then my opponent made a good play with Black 1 L-5. If White should play at E, Black could follow with Black 3 G-5 which would certainly be profitable for him, and there still remains the possibility for Black to enter the corner at the three-three point, F. White 2 at D offers the strongest resistance to Black 1, but if Black 3 were pushed in at B between the two White stones White would not escape unharmed from the resulting battle.


Diagram 9



White to play.

The problem now is: where should White play on the right side? The first thing to be decided is whether White should play first against the upper or lower right side. Comparing these two areas one finds that Black is stronger in the lower right than in the upper right. If the present opportunity is let slip and Black succeeds in reinforcing himself, say, with a play at A or B, it will become difficult to attack him there. Therefore it is clear that some play must be made there, but even with the play restricted to this area there are still many different possibilities. This is the problem which the reader is to analyze.

Diagram 10




Commonsense would suggest that in the lower right corner the correct play for White would be to attack from R-6, but if this were followed by the sequence; Black at A, White at B, Black at C, Black's possession of the lower side would have been assured. In addition to this the two White stones at R-6 and at B would remain as hostages while White could not expect to have everything his own way in reducing Black's territory in the upper right region and Black could also ensure more territory there. Therefore White 1 at R-6 is unattractive.

Again, if White should attack on the lower side at O-3 the sequence: Black 2 at P-3, White 3 at C, Black 4 at R is certainly unfavorable for White.

The prudent course in such cases as this is for White to come into the three-three point immediately, ensuring his possession of the profits to be gained there. The sequence actually played proceeded from Black 2 to 12 as shown here, but White 13 presents some difficult problems.

Diagram 11




Black to play.

This was the fourth game in the match played at Nagoya in the eighth *Honinbo* contest.

White 6 and 8 in the upper left corner are examples of Kitani's personal style which places much emphasis on taking a firm grasp on territory.


With three corners already strongly held as early as the twentieth play the tide of the game must now turn toward the center. The Black plays from 29 to 37 were a novel play on my part, and there are number of problems involved with them. Although they result in some local losses they show a consistent policy of developing strength on the outside for use in the mid-game. White 40 seizes firm control and at this point Black faces a serious crisis which will decide the fate of the entire game.

Diagram 12



Looking over the whole board at this point one sees that even if White should push outward at A on the lower left side, the result of the sequence: Black at B, White at C, and Black at D is that White would need to go back and play at E; therefore Black can fairly well block any White advance from the left side. With this assumption the only course left for both of the players in this situation is to throw all their forces into a battle for the center. Therefore I chose the decisive play, Black 41, my aim there being to find an opportunity to play the dominant role in the center through a continuing attack on the two White stones on the right side while they are still weak. I might also add that in Kitani's discussion of the game he says that White 38 should have been used to jump upward to F.

Diagram 13




White to play.

Black 1 holds back White and forces White 2, then Black extends with Black 3. Black's course in this sequence was very clever and Black 1 especially is at a most important point for the development of the strength of both players. If White had been able to play there his prospective territory on the left upper side would immediately have been greatly increased and Black's position on the right side would have been enfeebled.

It is now White's turn to play and there are various possibilities, such as:


- 1) To cap the Black stone at A.
- 2) To push in closer to Black 3 at B.
- 3) To jump upward at C.
- 4) To close at D, etc.

Diagram 14



The jump upward with White 1 is the most important play at this time. The essential thing in this case is the judgement of the general situation. At this stage of the game the formations in the upper left region are on the largest scale, therefore the urgent business of the moment concerns their attack and defense and it is there that one's thought must be concentrated. After White 1, if Black were to play elsewhere than in the upper left corner White might close it with White 3 and his territory would then become too large. Therefore Black 2 was used to invade at the three-three point. After Black makes a live group through the sequence up to Black 14 it is usually enough for White to play at A, but White can also omit this and extend to B or choose some other point.

Diagram 15




Black to play. (a game with a four-stone handicap).

The problem here is whether Black's plan in his play from Black 2 to 12 was good or bad.

My conclusion is that in this case this line of play is unattractive for the following reasons:

- A) In addition to the fact that there is already a White extension at C-9 from a firmly established base in the lower left corner, the value of Black 12 itself is not particularly large.
- B) Even after this extension with Black 12 the actual amount of Black territory is meagre enough because of the possibility of the following sequence: White at A, Black at B, White at C, Black at D, and White at E.
- C) Black's loss on the upper side is far greater than his gain from Black 12.

Diagram 16



The analysis of the preceding diagram shows clearly that there is little future for Black in playing on the left side. Therefore the intelligent course for him is to break new ground on the upper side with Black 2. If White then had jumped upward with White 3 at A Black could have replied with Black 4 at C-14 or at D-14, but since this is a floating formation without a foundation it would only invite an enemy attack in the future. When White 3 is played at the three-three point it is proper to check it with Black 4 as shown here and to continue on with the sequence to White 11 and beyond, for in maintaining the pressure to the limit Black builds up his force on the upper side.

The result of the play shown in this diagram is that Black has taken advantage of White's strong defence with the stone at C-9 and that in the end Black 2 has led White

into an over-congested formation and forced him to crawl along in the low territory on the left side.


Moreover, if White plays at B after Black 14, it will only mean that Black will accomplish his original purpose by means of the sequence: Black at C, White at D, and Black at E.

Technical Terms

atari 77, 195


check

A stone or a group of stones is in check when it has only one remaining liberty. It will be captured when its last remaining liberty is occupied by the surrounding stones.




bamboo joint 49

one example of stones which are not actually connected, but which cannot be prevented from connecting



dragonfly formation 100

large knight's play on both sides from a corner handicap point



fuseki 12, 13, 18, 22, 38, 106, 156

opening procedures; opening manoeuvres

Go sei gen (吳清源) 109, 115

most famous Chinese *go*-player (1914-)

gote 96


the second move (cf. sente)

gote no sente 56

the second play which promises the first play

hane 51

diagonal step adjacent to an opponent's stone




Honinbo 2, 34, 238

one of the biggest title of *go* in Japan; one of family names of the *go*-champion in ancient times

Hsuan Hsuan Ch'i Ching 玄々棋經 3
old Chinese text book of *go*

ikken shimari 16, 94, 147, 166, 170

one-point skip consolidating the corner by one space-extension from C-4 point; formation of two stones on 3-4 and 5-4 point




joseki 2, 8, 19, 36, 51, 80, 113

good example of corner play

ko 76, 77, 116, 117, 140, 154, 121

repetitive situation; literally means "eternity"

In a *ko* situation, after one player has captured a hostile stone, his opponent is not permitted to recapture until he has made one play elsewhere on the board.




ko-threat 209

an intervening play needed to recapture a hostile stone in *ko*

kogeima 68, 174, 183

small knight's play




korigatachi 129

over-redundance of strength; over congested formation


kosumi 50, 95, 110

diagonal extension




kosumitsuke 57

extension diagonal from a kindred stone and attaching to opponent's one (*kosumi*+*tsuke*)




ogeima 69, 101, 106, 182, 186, 202

large-knight's play



ogeima shimari 231

consolidating the corner by large-knight's move from C-4 point; formation of two stones on C-4 and F-3 point;



ishi-no-shita

play beneath the stones 123




bottom of stones

sente 65, 67, 72, 86, 87, 92, 101, 104, 108, 112, 118, 146, 151, 152

the first move; playing first

shimari 18

consolidating the corner by two stones






shodan preface

the first rank

shoulder 132, 136, 152, 158

takamoku 110, 213
D-5 or E-4 point in the corner

tsukenobi 45, 190, 194, 198, 224
first attaching, then extending



EXPLANATION

Positions on the board will be indicated by the combination of the letters at the bottom and the figures on the left, for instance:

Position a) will be shown as C-17

Position b) will be shown as J-10

Position c) will be shown as Q-5

The letter I is not used to obviate possible confusion with the figure 1.

